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REGULATING DIGITAL TRADE 
Sapna Kumar* 
Abstract 
Under § 337 of the Tariff Act, the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) has jurisdiction over articles that enter the country and infringe 
intellectual property rights. Recently, the ITC vastly expanded its powers, 
asserting jurisdiction over imported digital files that infringe intellectual 
property rights. This Article examines the limits of the ITC’s authority, 
arguing that it lacks jurisdiction over digital information, because 
information in the abstract cannot be controlled by a court or an agency. 
It maintains that the ITC has misconstrued the breadth of its statutory 
authority under the Tariff Act and that the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation show that Congress intended for the term “articles” to be 
limited to tangible personal property. Finally, this Article discusses how 
interest groups including the Motion Picture Association of America are 
attempting to use the ITC to block information at the U.S. border, and 
considers the significant risks that this poses to the public welfare. 
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INTRODUCTION 
People have engaged in international trade for thousands of years. 
Although scholars are divided as to whether contracts or customary 
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practices were historically more important,1 history clearly played a role 
in shaping modern trade law.2 The emergence of digital trade, however, 
has made it necessary to rapidly adapt trade law without historical 
guidance.  
In a short period of time, it has become possible for people to infringe 
the rights of intellectual property (IP) owners by transmitting information 
that could easily enter the country. Copyright law adapted to infringing 
information crossing borders, as mp3s replaced compact discs and 
streaming media began to displace television.3 Online file-sharing led 
interest groups to successfully lobby for strict criminal copyright 
provisions.4 Similarly, trademark law expanded to cover digital rights 
over domain names.5 
Patent and trade law, however, are only just beginning to adapt. A 
person outside the United States can now upload a digital model file to 
the Internet, allowing anyone in the United States with a proper 3D 
printer and an internet connection to infringe a patented device.6 Such 
technology is rapidly becoming affordable,7 leading to a call for statutory 
reform.8 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 
1155–58 (2012) (discussing the use of contracts and customs in early international trade but 
disputing the idea that traders relied on lex mercatoria customs to resolve disputes). 
 2. See id. at 1161 (“[S]ome types of medieval commercial private ordering, such as the 
bill of exchange or the marine insurance policy, demonstrated the ability to spread and become 
relatively uniform and universal . . . .”). 
 3. Notwithstanding all of the changes that have already occurred in the Copyright Act, the 
Register of Copyrights of the United States and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office Maria 
Pallante has called for Congress to overhaul the Copyright Act. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great 
Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 315, 315 (2013). 
 4. See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 49 (2001) (noting the success of content holders “in obtaining 
extremely broad legal protection for rights management systems”); Mark A. Lemley & R. 
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1404 (2004) (“[S]ome of the most powerful lobbying groups in the world are 
behind stronger criminal copyright enforcement.”). 
 5. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling New 
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 486 (2003) (discussing how the 
Anticybersquatting Protection Act (ACPA) authorizes a U.S. trademark holder to petition a court 
to transfer a foreign national’s domain name). 
 6. See Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds 
of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 560–61 (2014) (discussing how the Internet has 
made it possible for users to share digital models that can be used to print a wide range of goods). 
 7. See Liana Bandziulis, These Affordable 3-D Printers Are Impressive—and Plagued by 
Weak Software, WIRED (Oct. 28, 2014, 5:06 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/da-vinci-
printers. 
 8. See Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, 3D Printing & Digital Regulation, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 36), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601460 
(calling for 3D printing regulation under the Tariff Act and Patent Act); Deven R. Desai & Gerard 
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 The International Trade Commission (ITC) has been caught in this 
struggle.9 Although Congress designed the ITC to protect U.S. companies 
against the harsh effects of free trade, IP interest groups successfully 
expanded the ITC’s jurisdiction to include IP disputes when infringing 
articles are imported into the country.10 When an imported article 
infringes a U.S. patent, copyright, or trademark, the ITC can issue an 
exclusion order, which directs Customs and Border Patrol (Customs) to 
seize the article at the border.11 The agency’s primary jurisdiction is in 
rem. 
Recently, in Certain Digital Models, a majority of the ITC 
commissioners asserted jurisdiction over digital information12 as part of 
a wider move to regulate digital trade.13 The agency interpreted the term 
“articles” broadly to include all intangible digital information. In 
expanding its jurisdiction, the ITC has opened the door to claims for 
infringing blueprints, movies, and music transmitted from abroad. This 
case is currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit as ClearCorrect v. International Trade Commission.14 
 
                                                                                                                     
N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 
1691, 1694–95 (2014) (discussing the need to update patent law in light of 3D printing). 
 9. See Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1553 
(2011) [hereinafter Kumar, Expert Court]. 
 10. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 529, 544–45, 550 (2009) [hereinafter Kumar, Other Patent Agency]. 
 11. Id. at 534. 
 12. See In re Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, & Treatment Plans for Use in Making 
Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances, the Appliances Made Therefrom, and 
Methods of Making the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC Pub. 2013-18437, at 22 (Apr. 10, 
2014) (Final) [hereinafter Certain Digital Models (Final)], available at 
http://www.itcblog.com/images/Digital-Models-Commission-Opinion-lowres-10Apr14.pdf 
 13. The ITC defines “digital trade” as “U.S. domestic commerce and international trade in 
products and services delivered via the Internet,” and explicitly excludes “physical goods.” See 
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, DIGITAL TRADE IN THE U.S. AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES, PART I, at 1-1, 
1-2, Inv. No. 332-531, USITC Pub. 4415 (2013), available at http://www.usitc.gov/
publications/332/pub4415.pdf. The ITC’s interest in regulating this area is reflected in an 
expansive two-part study on digital trade that it released in 2014. See id. at i, xv; U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, DIGITAL TRADE IN THE U.S. AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES, PART 2, at 13, Inv. No. 332-540, 
USITC Pub. 4485 (2014), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4485.pdf.  
 14. A few days before this Article went into print, the Federal Circuit handed down its 
decision in ClearCorrect v. International Trade Commission, No. 2014-1527, 2015 WL 6875205 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015). In a 2–1 decision, the court reversed the ITC, holding that the ITC’s 
analysis failed Chevron Step One because Congress was clear that “articles” is limited to “material 
things.” Id. at *13. In dicta, the court also maintained that the ITC’s analysis fails Chevron Step 
Two because the ITC “failed to properly analyze the plain meaning of ‘articles,’ failed to properly 
analyze the statute’s legislative history, and improperly relied on Congressional debates.” Id. at 
*14. 
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The ITC’s move into the digital arena raises questions regarding the 
scope of the agency’s jurisdiction. In rem jurisdiction generally applies 
to real property, tangible property, and intangible property of a financial 
nature.15 Although some courts have found in rem jurisdiction over web 
domains,16 no court has claimed it over purely digital information. Thus, 
an argument can be made that the ITC lacks in rem jurisdiction.  
The ITC engages in formal adjudication and is eligible for strong 
deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
when it interprets its organic statute.17 However, the ITC’s expansive 
definition of “articles” is both unreasonable and inconsistent with 
Congress’s clear intent,18 and consequently fails both Step One and Step 
Two of Chevron.19 
After the failure of the proposed PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) and the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), several interest groups seeking to block 
infringing online content have turned their attention to the ITC.20 A 
leaked document from the 2014 Sony Pictures Entertainment hack (Sony 
hack) reveals that the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 
wants to use the Certain Digital Models decision to facilitate blocking 
infringing information on websites.21 Others have lobbied for legislation 
to expand the ITC’s jurisdiction to include web content.22 This is 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See infra Sections II.B–C. 
 16. ClearCorrect, 2015 WL 6875205 at *14. 
 17. Suprema v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that 
the Chevron framework is appropriate for reviewing ITC interpretations of § 337); Kumar, Expert 
Court, supra note 9, at 1549. 
 18. See Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 2, 5, 7 (Comm’r Johanson, 
dissenting). 
 19. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); see infra Section III.A (describing Step One and Step 
Two of Chevron). 
 20. See infra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 21. See Site Blocking: AGENDA (Aug. 15, 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1381538/250191720-agenda-oct-8-2014-sb-confab.pdf; see 
also Russell Brandon, Hollywood Is Still Obsessed with Breaking the Internet, VERGE (Dec. 15, 
2014, 3:44 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/15/7396639/hollywood-is-still-obsessed-
with-breaking-the-internet (discussing the leaked memo and the MPAA’s “single-minded focus 
on site-blocking” to prevent piracy); Eli Dourado, Is the MPAA Even Pro-Hollywood Any More?, 
MEDIUM (Jan. 13, 2015), https://medium.com/tech-liberation/is-the-mpaa-even-pro-hollywood-
any-more-9fef31467c36 (discussing the MPAA’s attempt to use the ITC to block websites and 
noting that “[i]t’s unlikely that Congress intended to vest the ITC with authority over all 
international telecommunications data transmissions”); Timothy B. Lee, How Hollywood Could 
Use Trade Laws to Create an Internet Blacklist, VOX (Jan. 6, 2015, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/1/6/7503315/hollywood-internet-blacklist-trade-law (noting that the 
leaked document “outlines a legal strategy” to use the ITC “to force internet service providers to 
block access to sites found guilty of distributing pirated content—an idea strikingly similar to the 
one internet activists defeated three years ago”). 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
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problematic, given that the ITC favors strong IP rights, notwithstanding 
harm the public welfare.23  
No information border or electronic checkpoint currently exists for 
digital information entering the United States.24 Indeed, outside a national 
security context,25 the government appears to lack authority to monitor e-
mail, private servers, or the like without a search warrant or court order.26 
Providing the ITC with jurisdiction over information could not only cause 
immediate problems with regard to access to digital content27 but also 
would likely lead to attempts to create a digital net through which all 
content must pass once technology makes this possible.28 Those that 
support such measures must still ask whether the ITC is the best 
institution to implement them. 
This Article is the first to examine the ITC’s jurisdiction over digital 
trade. Part I provides a brief overview of the ITC and discusses the nature 
of its jurisdiction. Part II discusses the scope of in rem jurisdiction and 
argues that it does not cover digital information. Part III considers what 
are “articles” and maintains that the ITC should not receive deference for 
its expansive interpretation of the term. Part IV examines how third 
parties are attempting to expand the ITC’s jurisdiction to create a digital 
border in the United States and considers the risks that this poses to the 
public.  
I.  THE ITC’S STRUCTURE AND POWERS  
Several groups have suggested that Congress and the courts have 
historically favored the strong enforcement of U.S. IP rights against 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See infra Subsection IV.A.3.b. 
 24. Other countries do have digital borders. The “Great Firewall” censors and blocks 
information that enters into China. However, the firewall does contain holes that allow determined 
individuals to circumvent it. Brad Stone & David Barboza, Scaling the Digital Wall in China, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/technology/ 
internet/16evade.html. 
 25. Barton Gellman et al., In NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber 
the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/ 
2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html (“Ordinary Internet users, 
American and non-American alike, far outnumber legally targeted foreigners in the 
communications intercepted by the National Security Agency from U.S. digital networks . . . .”). 
 26. See Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital: Fourth Amendment Particularity 
and Stored E-Mail Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 985–88 (2012). 
 27. See Brief of Amici Curiae Public Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier Foundation in 
Support of Appellants at 17, ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 17, 2014), at 17 (“The threat of a Commission cease and desist order could cause 
service providers to refuse carriage of new and innovative services, block access to data, and 
otherwise restrain an open and unfettered arena of technological growth.”). 
 28. See infra Subsection IV.A.3.a. 
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foreign entities.29 But this is not entirely correct. An examination of the 
ITC’s history shows that the agency has evolved over time, and was 
initially limited in power. Although the ITC and Article I courts have 
favored strong patent protection, the Federal Circuit has taken a far more 
measured approach, especially for method claims. 
Section I.A provides background on the ITC, explaining its structure 
and powers. Part I.B examines the rise of digital trade and discusses 
related IP cases. It discusses the ClearCorrect litigation and other 
relevant cases.  
A.  Introduction to the ITC30 
The ITC is an independent agency composed of six commissioners 
who oversee five administrative law judges (ALJs).31 Its predecessor, the 
Tariff Commission, was created in 1916. The Tariff Commission 
provided information to Congress to help it set tariff rates, made 
recommendations at Congress’s request, and provided information to the 
President to help administer the tariff laws.32  
Over time, the Tariff Commission’s powers were expanded. Under the 
Tariff Act of 1930, it gained investigative powers over acts of unfair 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See, e.g., Brief of the Motion Picture Association of America and Recording Industry 
Association of America as Amici Curiae in Support of U.S. International Trade Commission and 
Affirmance at 8, ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. Cir. 
Feb. 25, 2015), available at http://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-02-25-
Brief-of-AC-MPAA-RIAA-2.pdf (maintaining that “[t]here is no evidence that Congress intended 
to limit the scope of the statute to particular forms of merchandise or modes of importation, or to 
allow the statute to discriminate among technologies”); Brief of the Association of American 
Publishers as Amicus Curiae in Support of U.S. International Trade Commission and Affirmance 
at 9–10, ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 25, 
2015), available at http://publishers.org/sites/default/files/uploads/PandP/2015-02-25_ecf_
0073_brief_of_association_of_american_publishers_as_amicu.pdf (arguing that requiring 
Congress to update the Tariff Act to reflect technological changes would contravene case law of 
the now-defunct CCPA and that Congress not defining the term showed intent to leave the term 
open). 
 30. For a more detailed overview of the ITC, see Kumar, Other Patent Agency, supra note 
10, at 534–35. 
 31. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012) (“The United States International Trade Commission 
(referred to in this subtitle as the ‘Commission’) shall be composed of six commissioners who 
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”); 19 C.F.R. 
§ 210.3 (2014) (“Administrative law judge means the person appointed under section 3105 of title 
5 of the United States Code who presides over the taking of evidence in an investigation under 
this part.”); Administrative Law Judge Photos, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/bios/alj_photos.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (listing the five 
ALJs of the ITC). 
 32. ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL 
PROPOSALS 61 (1971). 
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competition related to international trade.33 In 1974, the agency was 
renamed the International Trade Commission and was given new powers 
to provide redress for U.S. companies that were the victim of unfair 
competition from imported goods.34 Among the new powers was the 
ability to grant cease-and-desist orders using nationwide in personam 
jurisdiction. President Richard Nixon supported the expansion of the 
agency in order to secure votes from protectionist congressmen for the 
liberalization of trade.35  
In the 1980s, the ITC’s mission was once again redirected. In 1988, 
IP interest groups successfully lobbied to strengthen the ITC to allow for 
greater protection of IP rights.36 In particular, patent holders wanted to 
take advantage of the ITC’s ability to issue exclusion orders, which direct 
Customs agents to seize infringing goods at the border.37 These groups 
were successful in convincing Congress to create a new provision in the 
Tariff Act that specifically addressed IP infringement. 
Although federal courts seldom grant injunctive relief, the ITC almost 
always grants an exclusion order when it finds that infringement has 
occurred.38 Consequently, ITC actions often have severe consequences 
for the infringer.  
                                                                                                                     
 33. Tariff Act, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 96, 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1330) (“To assist the President in making any decisions under this section the commission is 
hereby authorized to investigate any alleged violation hereof on complaint under oath or upon its 
initiative.”). 
 34. See Kumar, Other Patent Agency, supra note 10 at 542–44; S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 3–
4 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7187 (stating that the purpose of the 1974 
Tariff Act was “[t]o strengthen the independence of the United States Tariff Commission” and 
“[t]o improve procedures for responding to unfair trade practices in the United States and 
abroad”). 
 35. See Special Message to the Congress Proposing Trade Reform Legislation, April 10, 
1973, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 143 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office 1975) (President Nixon stating that “while trade should be more open, it 
should also be more fair”); Kumar, Other Patent Agency, supra note 10, at 542–44. 
 36. Kumar, Other Patent Agency, supra note 10, at 547–48. This lobbying resulted in the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which broadened Section 337 to facilitate its 
use for IP infringement by weakening the domestic industry requirement. Id. at 548–50; 
Comparing Major Trade Bills: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate 
One Hundredth Congress First Session on S. 490, S. 636, and H.R. 3, 100th Cong. 347 (1987) 
(“By proposing to eliminate the requirement of injury to an industry in the United States, the 
amendments seek to fundamentally alter the purpose for which Section 337 was enacted . . . to 
protect an established or about to be established U.S. industry from harm.” (statement of the ITC 
Trial Lawyers Association)). 
 37. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012) (stating that the ITC, upon a determination of a 
violation of Section 337, “shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded from entry into 
the United States”).  
 38. See Kumar, Expert Court, supra note 9, at 1557 n.45 (“There have only been three cases 
since 1974 where the ITC has found an imported good to infringe a valid patent, but declined to 
issue an exclusion order.”).  
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1.  Jurisdiction 
One of the ITC’s distinguishing features is that its primary jurisdiction 
is based in rem.39 When an infringing article is imported into the United 
States, the rights holder can file suit in the ITC.40 If the rights holder is 
merely seeking an exclusion order, it does not have to establish in 
personam jurisdiction over any of the wrongdoers.41 Instead, the ITC 
automatically has in rem jurisdiction over the imported article.42 
Although no provision in the Tariff Act explicitly mentions in rem 
jurisdiction, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals noted that “[t]he 
subject matter jurisdiction of the ITC over ‘the importation of articles 
into the United States’” coupled with the ITC’s “authority to exclude ‘the 
articles concerned’” confers jurisdiction.43  
In rem jurisdiction is important because it allows the ITC to remedy 
infringement when in personam jurisdiction does not exist, as is 
sometimes the case for manufacturers of infringing goods.44 The ITC’s 
primary power, granting exclusion orders, is an in rem remedy that 
attaches to the infringing article.45 When the ITC issues a limited 
exclusion order, it orders Customs to seize infringing articles that the 
named respondent attempts to import.46 When it issues a general 
exclusion order, it allows Customs to seize infringing articles regardless 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (discussing how the 
language of Section 337 is based on in rem jurisdiction, while the language of § 271 of the Patent 
Act is based on in personam jurisdiction).  
 40. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 41. See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981) 
(“An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties. Accordingly, that order was not 
contingent upon a determination of personal or ‘in personam’ jurisdiction over a foreign 
manufacturer.”). 
 42.  See id. 
 43. Id. at 986 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a), (d) (1976)). 
 44. See Kumar, Other Patent Agency, supra note 10, at 535; see also Annemarie Bridy, 
Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on Piracy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 
683, 691 (2014) (noting, in the context of civil forfeiture actions, “the in rem fiction gives the 
government power over property owners that it otherwise couldn’t get because of the heightened 
due process protections that apply when it acts in personam”). 
 45. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012) (granting the ITC authority to issue exclusion 
orders over articles), with 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (2012) (noting that the ITC may issue a cease-
and-desist order as an alternative remedy).  
 46. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012). 
9
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of the source.47 The ITC can also issue cease-and-desist orders, provided 
that it has in personam jurisdiction over the target.48  
2.  Customs Enforcement 
Although the ITC has formal adjudicative power over infringing 
imports, it lacks direct enforcement power. No part of the ITC’s organic 
statute permits the ITC to directly seize infringing articles. Rather, ITC 
exclusion orders are enforced by Customs, which is part of the 
Department of Homeland Security.49  
There is little guidance, however, on the scope of Customs’ authority 
with regard to exclusion orders. The only Customs regulation that 
addresses exclusion orders gives port directors authority to refuse entry 
of excluded articles.50 A Customs Directive from 1999 further states that 
“Customs enforces Exclusion Orders both prior and subsequent to their 
becoming final.”51 The Customs Office of Regulations and Rulings 
administers the exclusion order, and its Office of Field Regulation 
processes the exclusion order and transmits it to field officers.52  
                                                                                                                     
 47. The ITC can issue general exclusion orders where it “is necessary to prevent 
circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products of named persons” or “there is a pattern 
of violation of this section and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products.” 19 
U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2) (2012); see Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 
1356–58 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (comparing limited and general exclusion orders); Fuji Photo Film Co. 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 474 F.3d 1281, 1285–86 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing a pattern of violation 
involving importation of disposable cameras). 
 48. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (2012). 
 49. The Tariff Act states that the ITC “shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded 
from entry in the United States” and notes that the Secretary of the Treasury “shall, through the 
proper officers, refuse such entry.” Id. § 1337(d)(1) (2012). The U.S. Customs Service, which 
was part of the Department of Treasury, actually enforced the orders. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.71(a)(1) 
(2014) (“Whenever the [ITC] issues an exclusion order, the [ITC] may require any person to 
report facts available to that person that will help the [ITC] assist the U.S. Customs Service in 
determining whether and to what extent there is compliance with the order.”); id. § 210.74(a)(1) 
(noting that the ITC may modify reporting requirements of exclusion orders to help it “assist the 
U.S. Customs Service in ascertaining that there has been compliance with an outstanding 
exclusion order”). Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, all functions of the U.S. Customs 
Service, “including the functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto” were 
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), at which time the U.S. Customs 
Service became part of Customs and Border Patrol (Customs). 6 U.S.C. § 203(1) (2012). This 
agency is distinct from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
 50. See 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(2) (noting that articles covered by an exclusion order “will be 
refused entry”); id. § 12.39(b)(3) (“Port directors shall notify each importer or consignee of 
articles released under bond pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section when the Commission’s 
determination of a violation of section 337 becomes final and that entry of the articles is refused.”). 
 51. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUREAU OF CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CUSTOMS 
DIRECTIVE, No. 2310-006A, ¶ 3.2 (1999), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/2310-006a.pdf. 
 52. Id. ¶ 4. 
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The Directive states that “Customs officers should seek the advice of 
Customs laboratories . . . in determining whether goods meet the 
parameters of the subject patent.”53 It also notes that “[w]here goods 
determined to be subject to an Exclusion Order are presented to Customs, 
field officers must exclude the goods from entry into the United States.”54 
The choice of language is important because the term “goods” is 
generally limited to tangible property.55 
The focus on Customs’ power at ports of entry appears to prevent it 
from enforcing an exclusion order pertaining to electronic information. 
As Commissioner David Johanson noted in his dissent, “Electronic 
transmissions do not arrive at ports of entry, are incapable of being held 
in Customs custody, cannot be presented to Customs, and therefore can 
never be refused or denied entry.”56 Customs thus does not appear to have 
jurisdiction over digital information that arrives via the Internet.  
Consequently, for digital trade investigations, the sole power at the 
ITC’s disposal is its ability to issue cease-and-desist orders against 
conduct occurring in the United States. For example, in Certain Digital 
Models, the ITC affirmed the ALJ’s issuance of a cease-and-desist order 
against ClearCorrect prohibiting the importation of digital data sets. The 
ITC’s dependence upon such orders in digital trade cases raises two 
important questions, discussed in Part IV. First, given that in personam 
jurisdiction is required for issuing cease-and-desist orders, why is the ITC 
the appropriate forum for these cases? Second, by granting the ITC more 
power, is there a risk of government control over information at the 
border? 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Id. ¶ 4.1.1. 
 54. Id. ¶ 4.1.2. 
 55. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) defines “[g]oods” as “all things 
(including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the 
contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities 
(Article 8) and things in action.” U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2012). This definition generally excludes 
intangibles such as software. See generally Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986). In the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, which is enforced by Customs, “pirated copyright goods” are defined as “any 
goods which are copies,” therefore referring to only copyrighted works that are fixed. Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement art. 5(k), Oct. 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf. For a discussion of the 
definition of “goods” when the Tariff Act was passed, see infra, Section III.C. 
 56. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 6 (Comm’r Johanson, dissenting). A 
related agency—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—does have authority to seize 
web domains related to digital piracy or the sale of counterfeit goods. See Joseph Menn, U.S. 
Seizes Domain Names of 82 Websites, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2010, 6:57 PM), http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/2/2df7c1d4-fcac-11df-bfdd-00144feab49a.html#axzz3jDWliPGr. However, ICE does not 
appear to have any authority under the Tariff Act. 
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B.  The Rise of Digital Trade of Patented Goods 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[o]ur patent system makes 
no claim to extraterritorial effect,”57 and that the Patent Act was not 
meant to extend beyond the U.S. border.58 But the rise of digital trade has 
made boundary drawing quite complicated.59 Because the ITC’s 
jurisdiction is dependent upon importation, these problems are arising 
with increasing frequency inside the agency. 
1.  Digital Trade Under the Patent Act 
Although the ClearCorrect litigation will be the first time a court 
directly addresses the ITC’s jurisdiction over digital trade, the issue of 
transborder enforcement is not new. Several prior decisions under § 271 
of the Patent Act help shed light on the limits of extraterritoriality. 
a.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
Section 271(a) of the Patent Act covers direct infringement of a 
patented invention. It states that anyone who “without authority makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United 
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the 
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”60  
In the context of digital trade, the Federal Circuit has treated the 
infringement of method claims differently than other claims. In NTP, Inc. 
v. Research in Motion, Ltd.,61 the Federal Circuit considered whether 
Research In Motion’s (RIM) e-mail system for the then-popular 
Blackberry device infringed NTP’s patents under § 271(a).62 The 
technology RIM employed relied on routing information through a relay 
in Canada.63  
The court acknowledged that § 271 has limited territorial reach, and 
that § 271(a) was only actionable against infringement occurring inside 
the U.S.64 However, it noted that use occurs at “the place at which the 
system as a whole is put into service, i.e., the place where control of the 
system is exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained.”65 Because 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972). 
 58. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007). 
 59. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement, 68 TUL. L. 
REV. 1, 38–39 (1993) (predicting that the rise of global computer networks would pose patent 
enforcement problems and could lead to the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. patent law). 
 60. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 61. 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 62. Id. at 1287. 
 63. Id. at 1289–90. 
 64. Id. at 1313. 
 65. Id. at 1317. 
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RIM’s U.S. customers controlled the transmission of information and 
benefitted from the exchange of information, infringement occurred in 
the United States.66 
The Federal Circuit, however, treated NTP’s method claims 
differently. It held that a method is used within the United States only if 
“each of the steps is performed within this country,”67 and concluded that 
RIM did not infringe NTP’s method claims.68 Thus, compared to regular 
claims, the Federal circuit exercises a higher degree of scrutiny for 
method claims to avoid the extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law. 
This is important because the claims at issue in the ClearCorrect 
litigation also involves methods.  
b.  35 U.S.C. § 271(f) 
Section 271(f) of the Patent Act prohibits someone from providing 
“components of a patented invention” in a manner that induces someone 
outside the United States. to combine them, where such combination 
would be infringing had it occurred inside the United States.69 This 
section was meant to address the problem of U.S. companies exporting 
domestically made components that were then assembled abroad.70 
In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,71 the Supreme Court held that 
software, in the abstract, is not a component.72 The Court maintained that 
people buy and sell physical copies of software, not software in the 
abstract.73 It further noted that courts in general “should ‘assume that 
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other 
nations when they write American laws.’”74 
This case is interesting because the Supreme Court distinguishes 
between abstract digital information versus information fixed in a 
physical device. A similar distinction can be made with regard to the 
importation of information. Furthermore, the Court emphasizes the need 
for caution in applying U.S. laws to foreign activity. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1318. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012). 
 70. See generally Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972). 
 71. 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
 72. Id. at 451–52. 
 73. Id. at 452. 
 74. Id. at 455 (quoting F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 
(2004)). 
13
Kumar: Regulating Digital Trade
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1922 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
c.  35 U.S.C. § 271(g) 
Section 271(g) of the Patent Act prohibits the importation of products 
made by a U.S.-patented method. This provision was added under the 
1988 Process Patent Amendments Act, which expanded the Patent Act’s 
reach over foreign activity.75 
In Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Federal Circuit held 
that § 271(g) “is limited to physical goods that were manufactured and 
does not include information generated by a patented process.”76 The 
court emphasized the fact that the exceptions to § 271(g) do not make 
sense for information, and that Congress was solely concerned with 
protecting physical goods.77 Notably, the Federal Circuit stated in dicta 
that “nothing in [§ 337 of the Tariff Act] suggests coverage of 
information, in addition to articles.”78  
Overall, it is clear that the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit are 
concerned about extraterritorial applications of U.S. patent law, 
especially with regard to method claims. Moreover, both courts have 
declined to expand § 271 for methods infringed by intangible 
information. 
2.  The Rise of 3D Printing 
3D printing technology allows people to create solid objects from a 
digital model.79 Although this technology has existed for some time, it is 
now quickly becoming affordable and can be used to create everything 
from windpipes to working guns.80 Indeed, even high-end 3D printers 
                                                                                                                     
 75. See Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: 
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 607 (1997) (“The focus of the legislation is upon 
foreign activity—the use of patented process technology in another country; but, technically, the 
Process Act has no extraterritorial effect. Infringement arises only if and when someone imports 
the product into the United States.”). 
 76. 340 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 77. Id. at 1372–73. 
 78. Id. at 1373 n.9; see also Yangaroo Inc. v. Destiny Media Techs. Inc., 720 F. Supp. 2d 
1034, 1038 (E.D. Wisc. 2010) (declining to apply § 271(g) to infringement of a method of 
distributing content, noting that the method at issue did not cover the creation of content). But see 
Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a 
3D model of teeth was “a ‘creation’ produced by ‘practicing each step’ of a patented process”); 
CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 985, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a 
digital catalogue created by an infringing process is a product under § 271(g)). 
 79. See Osborn, supra note 6, at 555. 
 80. See Rob Stein, Baby Thrives Once 3-D-Printed Windpipe Helps Him Breathe, NPR 
(Dec. 23, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/12/23/370381866/baby-thrives-
once-3d-printed-windpipe-helps-him-breathe; Te Halterman, Activists ‘3D Print’ a Gun in Front 
of the Texas State Capitol as a Form of Protest, 3DPRINT.COM (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://3dprint.com/37168/ghost-gunner-texas-open-carry/; see also Ben Geier, Local Motors 
Shows Strati, the World’s First 3D-Printed Car, FORTUNE (Jan. 13, 2015, 1:14 PM), http://fortune.com 
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cost less than many personal computers of the 1980s.81 
As commentators have observed, 3D printing is positioned to provide 
major challenges for patent holders.82 Teresa Rea, the former Acting 
Director of the Patent and Trademark Office, has noted that the falling 
cost of the printing technology means that “we should anticipate that this 
will be a growing challenge for [IP] right holders and law enforcement.”83 
Part of the problem is that the use of digital models and 3D printers blurs 
the line between the exchange of mere information and the exchange of 
tools designed for patent infringement.84 
Patent law is currently not structured to protect patent holders from 
the distribution of digital models. As Professors Timothy Holbrook and 
Lucas Osborn have discussed, an indirect infringement theory under 
current law would be challenging.85 An inducement theory under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) would require showing that the accused infringer 
intended to induce patent infringement, which would be difficult if the 
accused infringer knew little about patent law.86 Contributory 
infringement would also be difficult to prove because it requires treating 
digital models as a “component” of a patented invention.87  
Professors Holbrook and Osborn optimistically believe that courts 
may possess enough power to recognize a direct digital patent 
infringement cause of action whenever someone sells or offers to sell a 
digital model directed to a claimed invention.88 But it is more likely that 
Congress would have to effectuate such a major change.89  
                                                                                                                     
/2015/01/13/local-motors-shows-strati-the-worlds-first-3d-printed-car/ (showing that large items, 
such as 3D cars, are now being created). 
 81. Cf. Chris Anderson, The New Makerbot Replicator May Just Change Your World, 
WIRED (Sept. 19, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/09/how-makerbots-replicator2-
will-launch-era-of-desktop-manufacturing/ (comparing the evolution of 3D printers to that of 
early personal computers). 
 82. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in 
an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319 (2015) (discussing difficulties in protecting 
patent rights holders). 
 83. Heesun Wee, The ‘Gold Rush’ for 3-D Printing Patents, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2013, 10:48 
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100942655. 
 84. Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 82, at 1353. 
 85. Id. at 1327, 1332. 
 86. Id. at 1337–38. 
 87. Id. at 1345, 1347. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., the Supreme Court held that, 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012), software in the abstract is not a “component.” 550 U.S. 437, 
449–52 (2007). This would make it challenging to apply § 271(c) of the Patent Act given that a 
term is generally given consistent meaning in the same section of a statute. 
 88. See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 82, at 1356–64. The authors emphasize that a 
thorough study should first be undertaken to examine the effects of digital manufacturing 
technology on the patent system. Id. at 1373. 
 89. See Ebrahim, supra note 8, at 34 (proposing that the Patent Act be amended to protect 
patent holders from infringement through 3D printing). 
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The lack of clear enforcement mechanisms in the Patent Act is 
important because it affects patent holders’ rights in the ITC. Under the 
Tariff Act, articles must infringe a “valid and enforceable United States 
patent.”90 While there is a provision of the Tariff Act preventing more 
general “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts,” that provision 
has a far stricter domestic industry requirement.91 Consequently, any 
proposal that expands the ITC’s jurisdiction over digital trade should 
consider the scope of the Patent Act as well. 
3.  ClearCorrect Litigation 
The ClearCorrect litigation involves plastic dental appliances, such 
as invisible braces. Align Technology (Align) has seven patents on a 
system for repositioning teeth, in which a series of custom-made aligners 
successively straighten the patient’s teeth.92 The claims at issue are all for 
methods of creating dental appliances, digital data sets, and digital 
treatment plans.93 None of the claims asserted were directed to a tangible 
product.94 
a.  ITC Proceeding 
The dispute dates back to 2006, when Align filed a complaint in the 
ITC against the OrthoClear companies,95 arguing that dental apparatuses 
imported from Pakistan violated two of Align’s patents.96 The two parties 
agreed to a consent order, in which OrthoClear agreed to not import 
dental appliances that violate Align’s patents and trade secrets.97 In 2012, 
Align returned to the ITC, arguing (1) that ClearCorrect violated the 
consent decree, and (2) that ClearCorrect was a successor, assignee, or 
agent of OrthoClear.98 ClearCorrect was structured as two entities, one 
Pakistan-based (ClearCorrect Pakistan) and one U.S.-based 
(ClearCorrect U.S.).99 
                                                                                                                     
 90. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).  
 91. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (requiring that the “threat or effect” of the unfair 
competition be “(i) to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States; (ii) to prevent 
the establishment of such an industry; or (iii) to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the 
United States”). 
 92. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 7.  
 93. Id. at 1, 16. 
 94. See infra note 105. 
 95. The name “OrthoClear” refers to three companies: OrthoClear, Inc. of San Francisco, 
California; OrthoClear Holdings, Inc. of Tortola, British Virgin Islands; and OrthoClear Pakistan 
Pvt, Ltd. of Lahore, Pakistan. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 4 n.3. 
 96. Id. at 1, 16. 
 97. Id. at 4. 
 98. Id. at 5–6. 
 99. Id. at 2. 
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2012 was the first time that Align complained about the importation 
of digital information, in the Certain Digital Models ITC proceeding.100 
ClearCorrect U.S. uploaded digital scans of patients’ teeth to its server, 
located in Houston.101 ClearCorrect Pakistan then downloaded the 
information in Lahore, Pakistan, and used it to create digital models of 
patients’ teeth, digital treatment plans, and other data; it uploaded this 
information to the Houston server.102 ClearCorrect U.S. finally 
downloaded the information and used 3D printers in Houston to create 
physical models of the patients’ teeth and then used the models to create 
the aligners.103 
Align maintained that these actions constituted the importation of 
patented articles, thereby violating § 337 of the Tariff Act.104 It claimed 
that the electronic data sets are articles, and that importation occurred 
when ClearCorrect Pakistan uploaded the data sets to the Houston 
server.105 The respondents maintained that digital data sets are not articles 
under § 337 and that uploading data to a server does not constitute 
importation.106  
The ALJ in Certain Digital Models ruled in favor of Align, noting that 
the ITC previously held that intangible software is an article.107 A 
majority of the commissioners affirmed, maintaining that a broad 
interpretation of “article” was warranted, with Commissioner Johanson 
dissenting.108 This case is currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit as 
ClearCorrect v. International Trade Commission.109 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See id. at 17. 
 101. Id. at 19. 
 102. Id. at 17. 
 103. Id.; see also Ricardo Pirroni, ClearCorrect Scales 3D Printed Digital Orthodontics 
Capacity by 30%, 3D PRINTING INDUSTRY (May 10, 2013), http://3dprintingindustry.com/2013/05 
/10/clearcorrect-scales-3d-printed-digital-orthodontics-capacity-by-30/ (noting that ClearCorrect 
Houston utilizes “a large number of ultrafine Objet Eden-line 3D Printing Systems,” allowing it 
to create custom aligners at a lower cost than traditional methods). 
 104. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 21–22. 
 105. Id. at 21–22. 
 106. Id. at 24. 
 107. Id. at 21–22; In re Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use 
in Making Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances, the Appliances Made 
Therefrom, and Methods of Making the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC Pub. 2013-18437, at 29 
(May 6, 2013) (Initial Determination) [hereinafter Certain Digital Models (Initial Determination)], 
available at http://www.itcblog.com/alj-rogers-issues-public-version-of-initial-determination-in-cert 
ain-digital-models-digital-data-and-treatment-plans-for-use-in-making-incremental-dental-
positioning-adjustment-appliances-made-ther. 
 108. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 22; see infra Part III. 
 109.  Brief of Appellants ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, ClearCorrect Pakistan, LTD, 2014-
1527 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2015). 
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4.  Other Relevant Cases 
Other decisions from the Federal Circuit, ITC, and U.S. Court of 
International Trade (CIT) have looked at the scope of “articles” or related 
terms. These decisions have favored giving the ITC broad powers, though 
none have conducted a detailed examination of the ITC’s legislative 
authority.  
a.  Federal Circuit 
In 2015, the en banc Federal Circuit decided Suprema v. International 
Trade Commission.110 A majority of the Federal Circuit granted Chevron 
deference111 to the ITC’s interpretation of “articles that infringe.”112 The 
ITC held that “articles that infringe” includes the importation of goods 
that are later used by the infringer to directly infringe, upon inducement 
from the seller of the goods.113  
Prior to Suprema, the use of Chevron deference for patent-related ITC 
decisions was controversial.114 In Kinik v. International Trade 
Commission, the Federal Circuit, in dicta, granted the ITC Chevron 
deference for its decision that defenses under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) were 
not applicable in the ITC.115 The case was so controversial that it led to 
Senate Hearings.116 Thus, Suprema is a significant departure from 
established Federal Circuit practice. 
The decision is furthermore notable because the majority referred to 
“articles” and “goods” interchangeably.117 As discussed in Section III.C, 
the contemporaneous legal definition of “goods” refers primarily to 
tangible property. Consequently, the majority appears to be recognizing 
a restriction in the scope of “articles.” 
Judge Kathleen O’Malley dissented, joined by Chief Judge Sharon 
Prost, Judge Alan Lourie, and Judge Timothy Dyk. The dissent 
maintained that “articles that infringe” is unambiguous and that the word 
“articles” “connotes a physical object.”118 Judge Prost and Judge 
O’Malley are both on the panel that is currently deciding the 
                                                                                                                     
 110. 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 111. See infra Section III.A.  
 112. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1352–53 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).  
 113. Id. at 1340. 
 114. See Kumar, Expert Court, supra note 9, at 156–68. 
 115. Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 116. Process Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 86–87 
(2007) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (testifying regarding controversy surrounding ITC’s 
decision that § 271(g) Patent Act defenses are not available in § 337 proceedings). 
 117. See generally, Suprema, 796 F.3d 1338 (referring to articles as “goods” on numerous 
occasions). 
 118. Id. at 1355 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/2
2015] REGULATING DIGITAL TRADE 1927 
 
ClearCorrect appeal, raising the likelihood that the ITC will be reversed. 
b.  International Trade Commission 
In Certain Hardware Logic, the ITC held that software is an article 
and issued a cease-and-desist order prohibiting the importation of 
software.119 It stated: “We do not think that the legislative history of 
Section 337 precludes coverage of electronically transmitted software; in 
fact, we believe that it supports the conclusion that such coverage is 
proper.”120 This case, however, involved software transmitted on a 
physical medium; no electronic transmission had occurred.121  
In earlier litigation involving some of the same parties and patents 
from Certain Digital Models, the ITC stated that “it has jurisdiction and 
authority to reach digital data that are electronically transmitted to a 
recipient in the United States.”122 On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted 
that, for its opinion, it assumed that the ITC had “statutory authority to 
exclude the importation of digital data that enters the United States 
through electronic transmission.”123 However, it explicitly stated that it 
“take[s] no position on whether Section 337 permits the Commission to 
exclude such importations,” leaving the issue to be settled at a future 
time.124 
c.  Customs and Court of International Trade 
Customs has read other parts of the Tariff Act to apply tariffs to 
digitally transmitted information. In a ruling letter,125 Customs found that 
“the transmission of software modules and products into the United States 
from a foreign country via the Internet is an importation of 
                                                                                                                     
 119. In re Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Sys. & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-383, USITC Pub. 3089, at 6, 18, 18 n.84 (Dec. 3, 1997) (Permanent Cease and Desist Order) 
[hereinafter Certain Hardware Logic Cease and Desist Order], available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/337/pub3089.pdf. 
 120. Id. at 28.  
 121. Id. at 5. 
 122. Align Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 771 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting 
In re Certain Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances & Methods of Producing 
Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-562, USITC Pub. 2015-11383, at 69 (Jan. 10, 2013) (Final)). 
 123. Id. at 1326 n.8. The panel only had two judges because of Judge Randall Rader’s 
retirement. Id. at 1318. 
 124. Id. at 1326 n.8. 
 125. A ruling letter constitutes highly informal rulemaking and is eligible for only Skidmore 
deference. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001) (holding that Customs 
Service letters, which do not go through notice-and-comment rulemaking, merely have the 
“‘power to persuade.’” (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))); see also 
What Are Ruling Letters?, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, 
http://www.cbp.gov/trade/rulings/ruling-letters (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (detailing the purpose 
of the letters).  
19
Kumar: Regulating Digital Trade
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1928 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
merchandise.”126 It stated that “[t]he fact that the importation of the 
merchandise via the Internet is not effected by a more ‘traditional vehicle’ 
(e.g., transported on a vessel) does not influence our determination” and 
that “[t]he essential facts are that merchandise in a foreign country is 
brought into the United States.”127 
Former Employees of Computer Sciences Corp. v. United States 
Secretary of Labor involved a challenge in the U.S. Department of Labor 
(Labor) by software developers whose jobs had been shifted to India.128 
Labor held that software not embodied on a physical medium is not an 
“article” under the Trade Act and that the plaintiffs were not eligible for 
job assistance, notwithstanding the fact that the software had been 
transmitted to the United States.129  
The CIT reversed, and held that substantial evidence did not support 
Labor’s decision.130 The CIT noted that the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
of the United States governs the definition of “article” in the Trade Act.131 
Under General Note 1, “All goods provided for in this schedule and 
imported into . . . the United States . . . are subject to duty or exempt 
therefrom . . . .”132 The CIT concluded that electronic software is in the 
category of “telecommunications transmissions” and is therefore an 
article.133  
II.  THE LIMITS OF IN REM JURISDICTION 
One of the ITC’s advantages is its use of in rem jurisdiction. This 
allows an IP holder to block infringing goods even if the importer or seller 
lacks sufficient contacts with the United States. However, the ITC has 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Customs Ruling Letter, HQ 114459, Letter from Kamen Lozey, Gen. Manager, 
Intellectronix LLC, to Jerry Laderberg, Chief of the Entry Procedures and Carriers Branch (Sept. 
17, 1998), available at http://rulings.cbp.gov/hq/1998/114459.doc. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Former Emps. of Computer Scis. Corp. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 
1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). The parties refer to 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2495 (2000) as the “Trade 
Act.” See id. Both the Trade Act and Tariff Act are from the same Title, Title 19. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1338, 1343–46. 
 130. Id. at 1343–46. It is unclear why the “substantial evidence” standard of review would 
be applicable to Labor’s interpretation of “article.” Statutory interpretations are questions of law 
and by default are reviewed de novo. Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 235). 
 131. Computer Scis. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. 
 132. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, General Notes, in HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 3 (2015), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/
bychapter/1501gn.pdf. 
 133. Computer Scis. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 2d at 1341–42 (quoting U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, 
General Notes, supra note 132). This interpretation would force all phone calls and e-mails to 
become “goods” as well, given that they, too, are also “telecommunications transmissions.” This 
absurd result calls into question the validity of the CIT’s interpretation. 
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failed to establish that in rem jurisdiction extends to digital 
information.134 
In rem jurisdiction plays an important role in the enforcement of IP 
rights. In personam jurisdiction exists only if one satisfies the minimum 
contacts requirement set out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.135 
But foreign entities that infringe U.S. IP rights do not necessarily have 
minimum contacts with the United States.136 In rem jurisdiction allows a 
court to determine all claims that anyone has regarding the property at 
issue,137 regardless of whether in personam jurisdiction is met.138 The 
only requirement is that the property itself resides within the court’s 
jurisdictional boundaries;139 notice need not be provided to the parties.140  
In a true in rem proceeding, the property the court claims jurisdiction 
over is subject to a dispute.141 This is the type of jurisdiction that the ITC 
asserts over articles; it is also used by courts in domain name disputes. 
By contrast, quasi in rem jurisdiction exists when the property subject to 
the legal proceeding is used to satisfy an unrelated claim.142 
This Part looks at existing case law regarding the reach of in rem 
jurisdiction over tangible property, financial intangible property, and 
domain names. It maintains that a key attribute of cases where in rem 
jurisdiction is found is the court’s control over the property at issue. It 
then concludes that digital information cannot be controlled, making in 
rem jurisdiction over it inappropriate.  
                                                                                                                     
 134. It is unclear whether in personam jurisdiction alone would be enough to confer the ITC 
with jurisdiction. The ITC must have in personam jurisdiction to issue cease-and-desist orders.  
 135. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 136. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and Choice of Law 
for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153, 158–63 (1997) 
(discussing the uncertainty of how this issue would be resolved under existing case law).  
 137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. c (1982); U.S. v. Grundy, 7 U.S. 
337, 356 n.* (1806) (“The proceeding being in rem, all the world become parties to the sentence, 
as far as the right of property is involved; and of course, all persons any wise interested in the 
property in question, are admissible to claim and defend their interests.”). 
 138. See Joseph J. Kalo, The Meaning of Contact and Minimal National Contacts: 
Reflections on Admiralty In Rem and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 59 TUL. L. REV. 24, 25 n.5 
(1984). 
 139. Fletcher R. Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 
YALE L. J. 241, 241 (1939). 
 140. Kalo, supra note 138, at 25 n.5. 
 141. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 n.17 (1977) (“A judgment in rem affects the 
interests of all persons in designated property. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of 
particular persons in designated property.”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958) (“The 
basis of the jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the forum State.”).  
 142. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199 n.17 (“A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of 
particular persons in designated property.”). 
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A.  Tangible and Financial Intangible Property 
In rem jurisdiction exists over all tangible property. With regard to 
land, the court can use in rem jurisdiction to force a sale to pay taxes owed 
to the state143 or to satisfy a private claim.144 For personal property, in 
rem jurisdiction shows up in several areas of law. In admiralty law, 
jurisdiction attaches to the vessel at issue in the dispute.145 In rem 
jurisdiction appears in civil forfeiture cases, where goods are used to 
facilitate criminal activity,146 and in commercial law, where ownership of 
goods is in dispute.147  
In rem jurisdiction also extends to some intangible property. For 
documentary intangible property—such as stock certificates and bills of 
lading—the property can be“merged” with a physical document in certain 
circumstances.148 In such cases, the “situs” or location of the property for 
legal purposes is the location of the document.149 
But what about intangible property not merged in a document? As 
Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo noted, “The situs of intangibles is in truth 
a legal fiction, but there are times when justice or convenience requires 
that a legal situs be ascribed to them.”150 In such cases, the court assigns 
a fictitious situs based on a variety of factors, a decision that is often 
controversial.151  
                                                                                                                     
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 694 (discussing state in rem power to 
collect delinquent taxes). 
 144. See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that while in rem 
and quasi in rem jurisdiction arising from the situs of purchased stock may be problematic, if one 
“visit[s] another State, or acquire[s] real estate or open[s] a bank account in it,” then one 
“knowingly assume[s] some risk that the State will exercise its power over [the] property”). 
 145. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 167 (1894) (“A judgment in rem, adjudicating 
the title to a ship or other movable property within the custody of the court, is treated as valid 
everywhere.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (limiting excessive civil 
forfeiture). 
 147. See, e.g., Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Six Consignments of Frozen Scallops, 4 F.3d 90, 
93 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing admiralty law in a dispute involving a negotiable bill of lading). 
 148. Merger occurs when by law “the right to the immediate possession of a chattel and the 
power to acquire such possession is represented by a document” such that the “document is 
regarded as equivalent to the chattel itself.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 cmt. a 
(1965). 
 149. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 247 n.16 (1958) (“Properly speaking such assets 
are intangibles that have no ‘physical’ location. But their embodiment in documents treated for 
most purposes as the assets themselves makes them partake of the nature of tangibles.”); see also 
Anthony Bagnuola, Note, “Show Me the Money:” State v. Western Union Financial Services and 
the Jurisdictional Significance of Electronic Debts, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 797, 800–01 (2011) 
(exploring the issues associated with wire transfers and the need for updated precedent to 
accommodate these modern issues). 
 150. Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 174 N.E. 299, 300 (1931). 
 151. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246–47 (citing Andrews, supra note 139). 
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For intangible property of a financial nature, courts apply a variety of 
rules in determining whether in rem jurisdiction exists. In United States 
v. Daccarett, a civil forfeiture case, a Columbian drug cartel used banks 
in the United States to store and move narcotic proceeds.152 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found in rem jurisdiction over 
the funds, which had entered an intermediary New York bank through 
interbank electronic fund transfers.153 In a subsequent decision, the 
Second Circuit noted that in rem jurisdiction exists regardless of the fact 
that the bank owns the electronic fund transfer.154  
By contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected quasi in rem 
jurisdiction over wire transfers from Western Union, where the transferor 
and transferee were both located out of state.155 Notably, the court found 
that Arizona’s in personam jurisdiction over Western Union was 
insufficient to confer in rem jurisdiction over the wire transfers.156 
The U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance in the context of quasi 
in rem jurisdiction. In Shaffer v. Heitner, a Delaware court asserted quasi 
in rem jurisdiction based on Heitner’s purchase of one share of stock in 
Greyhound, which was incorporated in Delaware.157 The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that in the interest of fairness, “all assertions of state-
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth 
in International Shoe and its progeny.”158 However, in a subsequent 
decision, a Supreme Court pluarlity declined to extend the decision 
beyond quasi in rem jurisdiction.159 Consequently, minimum contacts 
need not be established for in rem cases in the ITC. 
B.  Domain Names 
Until recently, the only pure intangible property subject to in rem 
jurisdiction was that relating to financial assets. But the creation of the 
World Wide Web and use of domain names led several scholars to argue 
that domain names should be treated as property and should be subject to 
                                                                                                                     
 152. 6 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 153. Id. at 44. 
 154. Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(noting that “[t]o be eligible for forfeiture, the EFTs needed only to be traceable to the illegal 
activities,” and that the ownership of the EFTs was wholly irrelevant). 
 155. State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., 208 P.3d 218, 219, 226 (Ariz. 2009). The State argued 
that “electronic credits” to the wired money were “debts” that existed wherever Western Union 
was subject to jurisdiction. Id. at 223. 
 156. Id. at 223. This is in contrast to the 1905 Supreme Court decision Harris v. Balk, where 
the Court held that a party’s physical presence in Maryland gave Maryland jurisdiction over the 
party’s debt. 198 U.S. 215, 222–23 (1905). 
 157. 433 U.S. 186, 194 (1976). 
 158. Id. at 212. 
 159. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620 (1990). 
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in rem jurisdiction.160 This Section examines the use of in rem jurisdiction 
over domain names, both by federal legislation and under the common 
law.  
1.  Federal Statutes 
Congress has made domain names property.161 Under the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), a U.S. trademark 
owner can petition a court to transfer a domain name from a foreign 
national to the U.S. owner.162 Such suits, however, are limited in reach 
because the trademark owner can only file “in the judicial district in 
which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain 
name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located.”163  
The Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property 
Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act) increased civil and criminal enforcement of IP 
laws.164 Section 2323(a)(1)(A) of the PRO-IP Act states that “[a]ny 
article, the making or trafficking of which is, prohibited” under several 
statutory provisions is property subject to forfeiture.165 As Professor 
Annemarie Bridy has observed, this provision has been used to seize 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 771 (2003) 
(“[D]omain names are better understood as a new form of property arising in the Information 
Age.”); Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 145 (2000) 
(arguing that in rem jurisdiction should be available “in the district in which the domain name is 
registered”). Other scholars have taken a more critical approach to internet property. See, e.g., 
Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 50–56 (2007) (discussing the 
popular view of “cyberproperty” and arguing that significant differences exist between computer 
resources and real and chattel property). 
 161. As the Eastern District of Virginia noted: “There is no prohibition on a legislative body 
making something property. Even if a domain name is no more than data, Congress can make data 
property and assign its place of registration as its situs.” Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-
Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
 162. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(C) (2012) (stating the situs of a domain name action in rem 
shall be “in the judicial district in which—(i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain 
name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located; or (ii) documents sufficient 
to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the 
domain name are deposited with the court”); see also Lastowka, supra note 160, at 51 (“The 
ACPA allowed for plaintiffs to proceed ‘in rem’ to recover domain names, legislatively reifying 
the notion that domain names were a form of virtual property.”). 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A); see also Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 
299–300 (2d Cir. 2002) (ruling that 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) did not allow Mattel to file suit in 
a judicial district of its choosing and then relocate the domain name’s legal situs to support that 
filing). 
 164. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property (PRO-IP) Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 206, 122 Stat. 4256, 4262–63 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2323 (2012)). See Bridy, supra note 44, at 709–10 (discussing the passage of the PRO-IP Act 
and the expansion of civil forfeiture law to online activity). 
 165. 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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thousands of domain names under the legal theory that the domain names 
were being used for counterfeiting and criminal copyright 
infringement.166  
2.  Common Law 
States have taken a variety of approaches in how they classify domain 
names.167 In Kremen v. Cohen, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that domain names are intangible property under California 
state law.168 The court noted that domain names meet California’s three-
part test for property rights: “First, there must be an interest capable of 
precise definition; second, it must be capable of exclusive possession or 
control; and third, the putative owner must have established a legitimate 
claim to exclusivity.”169 With regard to exclusivity, the court noted that 
“[r]egistering a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at 
the title office” because the registration “informs others that the domain 
name is the registrant’s and no one else’s.”170 
 In the bankruptcy case In re Alexandria Surveys International, a 
federal district court held that domain names are contractual rights—not 
property rights—under Virginia state law.171 The district court based its 
decision on a prior Virginia Supreme Court decision, Network Solutions 
v. Umbro International,172 in which that court held that “a domain name 
registrant acquires the contractual right to use a unique domain name for 
a specified period of time” and is “not subject to garnishment.”173 The 
                                                                                                                     
 166. Bridy, supra note 44, at 711. 
 167. For a detailed discussion of state regulation of domain names, see generally Frederick 
M. Abbot, On the Duality of Internet Domain Names: Propertization and Its Discontents, 3 
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1 (2013). 
 168. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding, in the context of a 
domain name dispute, that the plaintiff had an intangible property right in his domain name and 
that a jury could find that the domain name was “wrongful[ly] dispos[ed] of”). 
 169. Id.; see also Howard Beck, Bosh Wins a Legal Ruling in a Case on Domain Names, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at B17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/sports/ 
basketball/15bosh.html?_r=0 (discussing a California court decision that ordered the turnover of 
domain names to satisfy an outstanding judgment).  
 170. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030. 
 171. In re Alexandria Surveys Int’l, 500 B.R. 817, 822 (E.D. Va. 2013); see also Venkat 
Balasubramani, Federal Court in Virginia Court Says Domain Names Are Not Property, but 
Contractual Rights, TECH. & MKTG. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2014), available at http://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2014/01/federal-court-in-virginia-court-says-domain-names-are-not-property-
but-contractual-rights.htm (discussing Alexandria Surveys Int’l). 
 172. Alexandria Surveys Int’l, 500 B.R. at 822 (citing Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro 
Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86–87 (Va. 2000)). 
 173. Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 86; see also Daniel Hancock, Note, You Can Have It, 
but Can You Hold It?: Treating Domain Names as Tangible Property, 99 KY. L.J. 185, 191 (2011) 
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Virginia Supreme Court had expressed apprehension in expanding the 
reach of the garnishment statute in light of new technology.174 
Finally, in In re Paige, a bankruptcy court applying Utah law found 
domain names to be tangible property.175 The court noted that the Utah 
Supreme Court had held that “software is tangible personal property for 
tax purposes.”176 It further observed that a district court applying the Utah 
decision had held that web pages are also property due to having “a 
physical presence” and can therefore be subject to conversion actions.177 
The court concluded that “like web pages and software, domain names 
can be perceived by the senses and access to them can be physically 
restricted by the use of passwords and other security measures,” making 
domain names tangible property.178 
There are some useful conclusions that can be drawn from the above 
cases. For the states that recognize domain names as property, the courts 
emphasize that the ability to exclude or control the domain is key.179 
Furthermore, under Virginia state law, the courts exercise judicial 
modesty, declining to read new technology into the statute and noting that 
such changes must come from the legislature.180 Finally, under Utah law, 
the court focuses on whether the electronic information has a physical 
presence.181  
C.  Digital Information 
Beyond the boundaries of traditional property lies uncertainty. 
Although many scholars claim that various IP rights are analogous to real 
property,182 extending in rem jurisdiction to intellectual property has been 
                                                                                                                     
(discussing how a minority of jurisdictions, including Virginia, view domain names as contract 
rights). 
 174. Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 87 (“Without statutory changes, we are not willing to 
allow such results in Virginia simply because in today’s case we are dealing with ‘a unique and 
wholly new medium of worldwide human communication’ known as the Internet.” (quoting Reno 
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997))). 
 175. In re Paige, 413 B.R. 882, 918 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012). 
 176. Id. (quoting S. Cent. Utah Tele. Ass’n, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax 
Comm’n, 951 P.2d 218, 223–24 (Utah 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 177. Id. (quoting Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. 
Utah 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 178. Id. at 918. 
 179. See id.; Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 180. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 87–88 (Va. 2000). 
 181. Paige, 413 B.R. at 917–18. 
 182. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1665 (2003) (“Patent rights are exclusive rights that fit the classic formulation of a ‘property 
rule.’”); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 970–71 (1990) (maintaining 
that copyright law is a species of property law); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 
EMORY L.J. 367, 372 (1999) (critically analyzing the shift by courts and commentators to viewing 
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somewhat controversial.183 The ALJ and Commission opinions in 
Certain Digital Models do not provide any guidance.184  
The primary difficulty is that in rem jurisdiction does not attach to all 
forms of property. Consider a copyrighted song that has been fixed in a 
tangible media. Someone later infringes the copyright by singing the song 
in public. As the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah noted, the 
song that is in the infringer’s mind is “truly intangible,”185 and “[o]nce 
the song is in a person’s mind, there is no way that someone else could 
‘deprive’ that person’s ‘use and possession’ of the song.”186 In other 
words, there is nothing for in rem jurisdiction to attach to. 
In this regard, digital information is distinguishable from financial 
intangible property. For U.S. stocks, bank accounts, and the like, in rem 
jurisdiction exists somewhere in the United States. No matter what legal 
fiction the court adopts, money in a U.S. bank account can be controlled 
by some U.S. court. Thus, while the financial instruments might be purely 
intangible, something ultimately tangible is at stake.  
Likewise, digital information is distinguishable from domain names. 
Only one party can be in control of a domain name at a time, and courts 
are capable of seizing control over the domain names that are the subject 
of litigation inside the United States.187 Indeed, for the states that 
characterized domain names as property, a key point in the courts’ 
analysis was the ability to exclude others and to control the domain 
name.188 
In other words, unlike financial accounts or domain names, digital 
information can exist in a purely intangible state within the United States. 
For example, if a foreign company e-mails a dental treatment plan to the 
United States, the information is purely intangible until it is downloaded 
to a U.S. computer. And although a court or agency can control a 
computer with digital information, it cannot control the information 
itself—a key requirement for having in rem jurisdiction. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                     
trademarks as property); Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The 
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 691 (2007) 
(arguing that patents are property and are protected under the Takings Clause). 
 183. See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 5, at 486 (arguing that the ACPA allows U.S. trademark 
law to have extraterritorial reach). 
 184. The ALJ in Certain Digital Models concluded that in rem jurisdiction existed over the 
electronic information but ignored the underlying question of whether in rem jurisdiction could 
extend to digital information. Certain Digital Models (Initial Determination), supra note 107, at 
*11–14, *18. The Commission opinion assumes that jurisdiction exists. Certain Digital Models 
(Final), supra note 12, at 22. 
 185. Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Utah 2009)). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., In re Paige, 413 B.R. 882, 918 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012). 
 188. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
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unlike with domain names, electronic information can exist in multiple 
places at once.189  
The purely intangible nature of digital information also raises a 
concern regarding extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. law through the 
use of in rem jurisdiction. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted 
when dealing with extraterritoriality, “The general and almost universal 
rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”190 
Although this presumption has weakened over time,191 it is still strong in 
some areas of IP law, such as patent law.192 Any expansion of U.S. law 
to digital information raises the risk of applying U.S. law beyond the 
national borders.  
Related to this issue is determining when digital information is in the 
United States and thus subject to in rem jurisdiction, as well as to U.S. IP 
and trade laws. As Professor Elizabeth Winston observed, to understand 
the territorial limitations of IP law, one first must understand the 
boundaries of the United States.193 One could argue that entry occurs as 
early as when the packets of information are routed through a U.S. server 
or as late as when the U.S. end user receives the information.194 Although 
interest groups such as the MPAA aspire to have a digital border, one 
does not currently exist, making it impossible to determine when 
information enters the country.195 
                                                                                                                     
 189. For example, the dental diagrams at issue in Certain Digital Models existed in both 
Pakistan and the United States. 
 190. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). 
 191. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85–86 (1998) (discussing how the presumption has waned over the past 
century).  
 192. See supra Subsection I.B.i, see, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. 
Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2129–31 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
strict enforcement of territorial limitations for patents). Arguably, however, the presumption has 
been significantly weakened in trademark law. Nguyen, supra note 5, at 486 (arguing that the 
ACPA allows U.S. trademark law to have extraterritorial reach). 
 193. Elizabeth I. Winston, Patent Boundaries, TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 3–4), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411142 (observing that to 
understand U.S. patent law and its territorial limits, one must understand the meaning of the 
ambiguous terms “United States” and “this country”). 
 194. This approach could be problematic. Routing can be manipulated to cause electronically 
transmitted information to enter into countries that neither the sender nor the recipient intended. 
See Axel Arnbak & Sharon Goldberg, Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution: 
Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic Abroad, 21 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 323, 343 (2015) (discussing how internet traffic between two 
U.S. entities can be deliberately routed through other countries to circumvent Fourth Amendment 
protection). 
 195. See Eric Goldman, The OPEN Act: Significantly Flawed but More Salvageable Than 
SOPA/PROTECT-IP, TECH & MKTG. BLOG (Dec. 10, 2011), available at 
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An argument can be made that nationwide in personam jurisdiction 
alone arguably confers the ITC with jurisdiction over digital information. 
Although the ITC’s core jurisdiction is in rem, it does explicitly have 
nationwide in personam jurisdiction under § 337(f) for cease-and-desist 
orders.196  
The problem with that position, however, is that it substantially alters 
the ITC’s powers. Congress designed the ITC to have control over 
tangible goods, with in personam jurisdiction added in 1974 to augment 
it.197 There is no evidence that Congress intended to expand the ITC’s 
jurisdiction to include intangible imports when it added § 337(f). 
Moreover, without in rem jurisdiction, the ITC largely duplicates what 
litigation can already achieve under the various IP statutes and adds little 
to trade law. For these reasons, reviewing courts should be skeptical of 
the ITC’s attempt to expand its jurisdiction.  
III.  WHAT IS AN ARTICLE? 
Section 337(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act prohibits importation, sale for 
importation, and sale after importation of “articles that infringe a valid 
and enforceable patent.198 The ITC’s decision in Certain Digital Models 
turns on what “articles” means, with the ITC defining the term as 
“imported items that are bought and sold in commerce.”199 Because the 
ITC interpreted the term in formal adjudication, it is potentially eligible 
for strong deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council.200  
The ITC’s statutory interpretation, however, is full of errors and 
misstatements. The agency takes legislative history out of context and, 
on one occasion, misquotes it in a way that serves the agency’s position. 
It interprets dictionary definitions far more broadly than the text supports, 
and it tries to make analogies to statutes and to cases that are neither 
contemporaneous nor are relevant. These errors allow the ITC to choose 
an overly broad definition of “articles” that legislative history does not 
support. 
 
                                                                                                                     
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/12/the_open_act_de.htm (discussing how legislation 
seeking to expand ITC jurisdiction over digital information has a “Fortress USA” mentality that 
“makes zero sense for digital bits zinging around the borderless network”). 
 196. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (2012). 
 197. The ITC concedes in its ClearCorrect brief that the cease-and-desist order provision 
was a “lesser remedy” when it was enacted in 1974, though it claims that “subsequent amendments 
have changed its character.” Brief of Appellee International Trade Commission at 29, 
ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2015). 
 198. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B). For a discussion of what constitutes a valid and enforceable 
patent, see Kumar, Expert Court, supra note 9, at 1562–85. 
 199. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 40. 
 200. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see infra Section III.A. 
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This Part reviews the ITC’s statutory interpretation in Certain Digital 
Models. Section III.A discusses why the Chevron framework is 
appropriate. Section III.B looks at the plain meaning of “articles.” Section 
III.C examines the early and late legislative history of the Tariff Act and 
it concludes that the broadest definition it supports is for personal 
property, which excludes pure digital information. Section III.D agrees 
with the ITC that the Tariff Act should not be read together with other IP 
statutes. It further maintains that the ITC’s reliance on the 1994 Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act is inappropriate. Section III.E argues that the 
ITC’s interpretation is contrary to Congress’s clear intent and is also 
unreasonable, therefore failing both steps of Chevron. It concludes that 
the Federal Circuit should reverse the ITC.  
A.  Chevron Framework Is Applicable 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron applies to the Federal 
Circuit’s review of the ITC’s interpretation of “articles.”201 In Chevron, 
the Court created a two-step framework for reviewing an agency’s 
interpretation of its organic statute. For Step One, the reviewing court 
first considers “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”202 If the court finds that Congress’s intent is clear, the 
court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”203 However, if Congress’s intent is not clear, the court moves 
to Step Two, where it asks “whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”204  
The ITC interpreted “articles” through formal adjudication, in 
accordance with §§ 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act.205 
Consequently, the Chevron framework is applicable.206  
The Chevron framework is far from monolithic. In Step One, some 
courts emphasize plain meaning, others emphasize legislative history, 
                                                                                                                     
 201. Before applying the Chevron test, one must engage in a “step zero” analysis, asking 
whether the Chevron framework is appropriate. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). 
 202. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 203. Id. at 842–43. 
 204. Id. at 843. 
 205. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012) (“Each determination under subsection (d) or (e) of this 
section shall be made on the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with 
the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5.”). 
 206. See Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1138, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (holding that the Chevron framework is appropriate for reviewing the ITC’s interpretation 
of Section 337); see also Kumar, Expert, supra note 9, at 1568–75 (discussing at length why the 
Chevron framework is applicable to the ITC). In the ClearCorrect v. International Trade 
Commission appeal, the ITC sought Chevron deference. Brief of Appellee, supra note 197, at 18–
19. 
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and some look to all of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation.207 
Resolving which approach to Chevron is correct is beyond the scope of 
this Article. Consequently, this Part examines the ITC’s analysis from 
several angles: plain meaning, legislative history, canons of construction, 
and statutory context. 
The most coherent version of Step Two comes from the D.C. Circuit, 
which applies the same standard used in review of policy questions.208 
The D.C. Circuit considers “whether the agency’s interpretation of its 
statutory directive is a reasonable one.”209 The court will “defer to the 
agency’s permissible interpretation, but only if the agency has offered a 
reasoned explanation for why it chose that interpretation.”210 To 
determine whether an agency’s interpretation is “rationally related to the 
goals of the statute,” the court again uses the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, while considering the rationales that the agency provided 
in its decision.211 The Supreme Court has recently signaled that it 
supports this type of approach, noting that they will not “disturb an 
agency rule unless it is arbitrary or capricious in substance.”212 
The Federal Circuit appears to have adopted the D.C. Circuit’s version 
of Step Two in Suprema v. International Trade Commission.213 In this 
case, the en banc Federal Circuit examined whether the ITC’s 
interpretation was “consistent with the statutory text, policy, and 
legislative history of Section 337.”214 It then performed a detailed review 
of the Tariff Act, the legislative history, and the policy goals of Congress, 
and concluded that the agency’s interpretation was reasonable.215 
                                                                                                                     
 207. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 817 (2010) 
(discussing Chevron’s multiple meanings, including “traditional tools Chevron” and “plain 
meaning Chevron” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 208. M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A 
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 85, 93–94 (John Fitzgerald 
Duffy & Michael Herz, eds. 2005). 
 209. Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497, 1506 
(D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 210. Village of Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 211. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The D.C. Circuit’s approach to Step Two is very 
similar to the “hard look” approach to arbitrary and capricious review. Magill, supra note 208, at 
95–96. 
 212. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011); see 
also Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (noting, in dicta, that “under Chevron step 
two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is “‘arbitrary or capricious in substance’”) (quoting 
Mayo, 562 U.S. at 53). 
 213. 796 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1349–52 
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B.  Plain Meaning 
When applying Chevron Step One, courts will generally look to the 
plain meaning of the text.216 This textualist approach typically utilizes 
dictionary definitions to help ascertain ordinary meaning.217 Although the 
Supreme Court has taken conflicting positions on the use of plain 
meaning,218 it is clear that it plays an important role in a Chevron 
analysis.219 
The Tariff Act does not define the term “articles.”220 Nor does the 
legal dictionary definition of “article” help shed light on the term’s 
meaning. As the ITC noted, the second edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
is contemporaneous with the passage of the original 1922 Tariff Act.221 
That dictionary, however, only defines the term with regard to written 
documents, not with regard to trade.222  
The ITC attempted to discern the plain meaning of “articles” using 
regular dictionary definitions. It noted that a 1924 edition of Webster’s 
Dictionary defines the term as “[s]omething considered by itself and as 
apart from other things of the same kind or from the whole of which it 
forms a part; also, a thing of a particular class or kind; as, an article of 
                                                                                                                     
 216. See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (using plain 
meaning to interpret a housing statute); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make 
Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 828 (2006) 
(discussing how “a prominent approach” for courts is to rely upon plain meaning of the statutory 
text). 
 217. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 351, 356–57 (1994) (noting that “it is probably fair to say that the textualist method, with 
its search for the ordinary meaning ascribed to words by the contemporaneous reader, probably 
leads to the dictionary more often than does the approach that frames the inquiry in terms of 
legislative intent”).  
 218. For example, in Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, the Supreme Court relied 
solely on the plain language of the statute, looking at the meaning of the word “or.” 535 U.S. 125, 
131 (2002). By contrast, in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, the Supreme Court 
looked to legislative history and the purpose of the statute, notwithstanding a contrary clear 
reading of the text. 540 U.S. 581, 586–87 (2004). 
 219. See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 CHI. L. REV. 823, 829 (2006) (discussing how “a 
prominent approach” to the Chevron 2-step test “has relied on the ‘plain meaning’ as reflected in 
the statutory text”). 
 220. The only related discussion appears in 19 U.S.C. § 1332, which states that “[t]he term 
‘article’ includes any commodity, whether grown, produced, fabricated, manipulated, or 
manufactured.” 19 U.S.C. § 1332(e)(1) (2012). 
 221. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 43. 
 222. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 90 (2d. ed. 1910) (defining “[a]rticle” as “[a] separate and 
distinct part of an instrument or writing comprising two or more particulars; one of several things 
presented as connected or forming a whole”).  
32
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/2
2015] REGULATING DIGITAL TRADE 1941 
 
merchandise; salt is a necessary article.”223 Looking to several other 
definitions, the ITC conceded that “an ‘article’ was understood to include 
something material,” yet concluded that “the term was also understood to 
embrace a broader meaning that describes something that is traded in 
commerce.”224  
The ITC used the secondary definition of “article”—a piece of 
writing—to support its argument that the term’s meaning is broad. It 
noted that newspaper articles and stock quotes that were transmitted 
“electronically” in the early 1900s gave rise to unfair competition 
actions.225 The ITC’s reliance on telegraph cases is perplexing, given that 
the cases cited to were based on in personam jurisdiction, not in rem. 
Moreover, although the word “article” describes both stories appearing 
in newspapers as well as objects subject to trade, it does not mean that 
the cases for one kind of article can be used as a source of law for another. 
Overall, the ITC’s discussion of dictionary definitions makes little sense. 
C.  Legislative History 
There are two points in history where the legislative history of the 
Tariff Act might provide us with guidance. The first is the period of time 
when “articles” appeared in § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and its 
predecessor, § 316 of the 1922 Tariff Act.226 The second is the legislative 
history from 1988, which was when the Tariff Act was expanded to 
explicitly cover IP infringement.227 Looking at the House and Senate 
reports from these time periods shows that Congress intended for 
“articles” to be a narrow term. 
1.  Early Legislative History 
The ITC in Certain Digital Models maintained that the legislative 
history of the original Tariff Act, coupled with contemporaneous 
dictionary definitions, supported its conclusion that “articles” is a broad 
term that includes any item “traded in commerce, regardless of form or 
type.”228 It claimed that “articles” are “synonymous with goods, 
commodities, and merchandise.” The ITC also maintained that those 
                                                                                                                     
 223. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 39 (quoting WILLIAM TORREY HARRIS, 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 
1712 (1924)). 
 224. Id. at 39 n.20.  
 225. Id. at 40 (citing Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); Nat’l 
Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902)).  
 226. Id. at 37. 
 227. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.  
 228. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 43–45 (citing S. REP. NO. 67-595, at 3 
(1922); H.R. REP. NO. 71-7, at 3 (1929); 71 CONG. REC. S. 3872, 4640 (1929)). 
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terms “do not provide any particular limitations as to specific categories 
of articles[,]” and that they would “encompass within their meaning 
various types and forms of products that are bought and sold in 
commerce.”229 However, a close inspection of the early legislative history 
and the contemporaneous Black’s Law Dictionary reveals that the term 
“articles” is far more restricted.  
a.  1922 Legislative History 
The Senate Report for the 1922 Act proposed amendments to the 
House Bill to “prohibit the importation of particular goods for the 
purpose of preventing unfair methods of competition in the importation 
of goods.”230 The Report noted: “The provision relating to unfair methods 
of competition in the importation of goods is broad enough to prevent 
every type and form of unfair practice.”231  
The Report’s focus on preventing all unfair practices with respect to 
goods is notable because it significantly restricts the scope of § 337. The 
Second Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, which the ITC used in its 
opinion, states that “[g]oods” in the context of contracts “is not so wide 
as ‘chattels,’ for it applies to inanimate objects, and does not include 
animals or chattels real.”232 For the related phrase “[g]oods and chattels,” 
Black’s notes that the phrase “is a general denomination of personal 
property, as distinguished from real property.”233 Personal property in 
1910 fell into two categories: “(1) corporeal personal property, which 
includes movable and tangible things,” and “(2) incorporeal personal 
property, which consists of such rights as personal annuities, stocks, 
shares, patents, and copyrights.”234 Because information is neither 
corporeal nor a right, it cannot be a good, and is therefore outside the 
scope of what Congress intended for § 337.  
Indeed, in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the 
Supreme Court had to determine what “origin” of “goods” refers to under 
the Lanham Act, which was passed in 1946.235 There, the Court held that 
the phrase was limited to tangible products,236 emphasizing that the 
Lanham Act’s common law foundations “were not designed to protect 
                                                                                                                     
 229. Id. at 43. 
 230. S. REP. NO. 67-595, at 3 (emphasis added).  
 231. Id. (emphasis added).  
 232. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 544 (2d. ed. 1910). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 956 (emphasis added). 
 235. 539 U.S. 23, 24 (2003). 
 236. Id. at 31–32 (holding that “the most natural understanding of the ‘origin’ of ‘goods’—
the source of wares—is the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace” and holding 
that “‘origin of goods’ is in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated 
the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain”). 
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originality or creativity.”237 This further illustrates that “goods” is a 
narrow term. 
The limitation to “goods” in the Senate Report is also notable because 
the ITC omitted it in the Commission opinion. It stated that “[t]he central 
purpose of Section 337, since the enactment of the original statute in 
1922, has been to prevent every type of unfair act or practice in import 
trade that harms U.S. industries.”238 The ITC then quoted the Senate 
Report, omitting the limiting phrase “in the importation of goods” and 
failed to indicate the deletion.239 This omission, while likely inadvertent, 
is nevertheless highly misleading. 
b.  1929 Legislative History 
While the 1929 Senate Report consistently used the term “articles” in 
the context of unfair competition,240 the 1929 House Report used 
“articles” and “products” interchangeably.241 For example, the House 
Report noted that “[i]mported articles are sold [in the United States] at 
whatever prices may be obtained, irrespective of the cost of producing 
such products abroad.”242 However, the term “product” is not defined in 
the second edition of Black’s Law Dictionary.243  
The House Report also used the phrase “goods, wares, and 
commodities.”244 Black’s definition for a similar phrase, “[g]oods, wares, 
and merchandise,” states that the term is “[a] general and comprehensive 
                                                                                                                     
 237. Id. at 37. 
 238. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 45 (emphasis added). 
 239. Id. During oral arguments for ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade 
Commission, Chief Judge Prost and Judge O’Malley verified that my finding was correct, and 
questioned the ITC about whether the misquote undercuts their argument that Congress intended 
“articles” to be a broad term. Oral Argument at 24:30, ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015 (No. 2014-1527), available at http://oralarguments.cafc. 
uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2014-1527.mp3 (at 24:30).  
 240. See S. REP. NO. 71-37, at 59–68 (1929). The Senate Report uses the term “merchandise” 
when referring to §§ 340, 402, 483, and 526. Id. at 68–75. 
 241. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 71-7, at 3 (1929) (noting that “many new products have entered 
the markets since 1922” and discussing the need for updating the tariff schedule). 
 242. Id. at 4. 
 243. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 951 (2d ed. 1910). If one resorts to using general 
dictionaries, one argument can be made to support the ITC’s broad definition of “article.” In a 
1924 dictionary that the ITC used in its opinion, the definition of “product” is very broad, covering 
“[a]nything produced, as by generation, growth, labor, or thought,” with the example “the 
products of the brain” given. HARRIS, supra note 223, at 1712; see also Certain Digital Models 
(Final), supra note 12, at 39 (citing to HARRIS, supra to define “article”). However, general 
dictionaries are usually not a good indicator of the legal meaning of terms, and it is unclear 
whether other contemporaneous dictionaries have the same definition. 
 244. H.R. REP. NO. 71-7, at 3, 9 (noting that “the duties on some goods, wares, and 
commodities . . . were placed too low” and that “[f]oreign competitors have an uncanny aptitude 
for discovering what goods, wares, and commodities are [i]nsufficiently protected”). 
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designation of such chattels as are ordinarily the subject of traffic and 
sale.”245 The term “chattel,” however, is primarily limited to personal 
property.246 Black’s defines the term as “[a]n article of personal property; 
any species of property not amounting to a freehold or fee in land.”247 
Although the second part of this definition could be construed broadly, 
Black’s further notes that “chattel” is “[t]he name given to things which 
in law are deemed personal property.”248 As discussed above, the only 
type of intangible personal property is rights, such as stocks or patent 
rights.249 
Consequently, the broadest definition for “articles” that the legislative 
history supports is “personal property,” which does not include 
information. For reasons discussed below, even this definition is likely 
overly broad and should be restricted further to tangible personal 
property. 
2.  Late Legislative History 
The ITC attempted to use non-contemporaneous legislative history to 
further support its claim that “articles” includes digital information.  
It emphasized the fact that in the 1987 Senate Report, “the will of 
Congress” was to block any U.S. sale of a product covered by an IP right 
because “[t]he importation of any infringing merchandise derogates from 
the statutory right, diminishes the value of the intellectual property, and 
thus indirectly harms the public interest.”250 The ITC, however, neglected 
to mention that the contemporaneous definition of “[m]erchandise” is 
restricted to “[a]ll goods which merchants usually buy and sell,”251 and 
that “[g]oods” is generally limited to a subset of tangible property.252  
Moreover, no explicit support exists in the recent legislative history 
                                                                                                                     
 245. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 544 (2d. ed. 1910). While clearly the phrase in Black’s 
differs from that used by Congress, the term “commodities” is defined as “[g]oods, wares, and 
merchandise of any kind; movables; article of trade or commerce.” Id. at 225. “Merchandise” is 
defined as “[a]ll commodities which merchants usually buy and sell.” Id. at 773. 
 246. See id. at 194. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 250. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 48 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 
128–29 (1987)). 
 251. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 890 (5th ed. 1979).  
 252. Id. at 624 (noting that the term “[g]oods” is one of “variable content and meaning” that 
is as broad as “every species of personal property” or much more restricted). It ultimately defines 
the term: “Items of merchandise, supplies, raw materials, or finished goods. Sometimes the 
meaning of ‘goods’ is extended to include all tangible items.” Id. Indeed, beginning in 2004, 
Black’s definition of “merchandise” states that “this definition generally excludes . . . intangibles 
such as software.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (8th ed. 2004). 
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for “articles” including digital information. The last major amendment to 
§ 337 was in 1988—one year before the invention of the World Wide 
Web253 and at a time when 9600 baud modems were considered to be a 
“blazing” transmission speed.254 Congress did not appear to foresee the 
day when complex models of patented goods could be electronically 
transmitted, and when copyrighted songs and movies could easily be 
downloaded. 
The ITC’s analysis, moreover, is based on the false claim that one of 
the overarching goals of the Tariff Act was to protect U.S. IP rights. As 
the dissent noted, “Section 337 is not the international extension of our 
patent, copyright, and trademark laws, but has restrictions that stem from 
the fact that it is, first and foremost, a trade law.”255 When the Tariff Act 
was revised in 1974 and the modern ITC was created, its purpose was to 
appease protectionists opposed to trade liberalization, not IP attorneys.256 
In 1988, the IP lobby did finally succeeded in amending the Tariff Act 
to add explicit provisions covering importation and post-importation sale 
of “articles” that infringe valid and enforceable patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks.257 But at no point did Congress express an intent to alter what 
“articles” are, or to make the Tariff Act a statute that evolves with 
technological advances. The ITC in Certain Digital Models claimed that 
“each time the statute has been amended, the legislative history has stated 
that the legislative purpose is . . . to strengthen protection of intellectual 
property.”258 Yet, despite numerous amendments to the Tariff Act over 
the years, only the 1988 amendment explicitly strengthened IP rights. 
Moreover, a subsequent amendment in 1994 weakened IP rights by 
allowing respondents to stay parallel litigation in federal court.259 
The ITC argued that “[t]he fact that Congress did not place express 
restrictions limiting the scope of ‘articles’ to any particular type or form 
is instructive as to the meaning of this term.”260 However, this disregards 
                                                                                                                     
 253. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Deconstructing Code, 6 YALE J. L. & TECH. 277, 290 
(2003–2004). The World Wide Web was invented in 1989 by Tim Berners-Lee and did not enter 
the public domain until 1993. CERN, The Birth of the Web, http://home.cern/topics/birth-web (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 254. John H. Humphrey & Gary S. Smock, High-Speed Modems, BYTE, June 1, 1988, at 102. 
(“A new crop of modems take transmission rates to a blazing 9600 bps and beyond.”). Such 
modems cost $900 to $2000. Id. 
 255. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 1–2 (Comm’r Johanson, dissenting). 
 256. Id. at 544 (“The final bill . . . reflected the compromise made between free trade 
supporters and protectionists.”). 
 257. Id. at 548. 
 258. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 37. 
 259. Kumar, Other Patent Agency, supra note 10, at 539. The Tariff Act was amended in 
1994 to fix a violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Id. at 539 n.59.  
 260. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 37. 
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the fact that Congress implicitly restricted the scope of the term by using 
terms of art such as “goods” and “merchandise” in the legislative history. 
This is sufficient to show that Congress spoke clearly regarding the 
meaning of “article” and that a Step One failure has occurred.  
D.  Canons of Construction 
Canons are part of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation that 
are used in a Chevron Step One analysis. This Section uses three of those 
canons—in pari materia, statutory context, and the presumption of 
consistent usage—to interpret the meaning of “articles” in § 337. 
1.  In Pari Materia 
The canon of in pari materia (“upon the same subject”) allows one 
statute to be interpreted in light of other sources of law that have a 
common purpose.261 During the ClearCorrect litigation, the MPAA 
argued that the Patent Act and other IP statutes have been interpreted 
expansively and so should the Tariff Act.262 For example, in Bilski v. 
Kappos, the majority of the Supreme Court held that § 101 encompasses 
business method patents, notwithstanding the fact that such methods were 
not subject to patent law at the time the Patent Act was passed.263  
The ITC was correct in rejecting the MPAA’s reading. The Patent Act 
and the Tariff Act do not completely overlap with regard to the range of 
patented inventions covered. For example, in Bayer AG v. Housey 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Federal Circuit stated:  
We recognize that § 337 covers both articles that were 
‘made’ and articles that were ‘produced, processed, or 
mined.’ While this language in § 337 perhaps suggests a 
broader scope for § 337 than for section 271(g) [of the Patent 
Act], nothing in § 337 suggests coverage of information, in 
addition to articles, under section 271(g).264 
This statement illustrates that the Patent Act is not the same in scope as 
the Tariff Act.  
Moreover, a strong argument can be made that it is not appropriate to 
read nontechnical terms in the Tariff Act in light of the Patent Act.265 The 
                                                                                                                     
 261. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243–45 (1972). 
 262. The MPAA commits this fallacy, citing to Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315–
16 (1980), for the proposition that a statute’s silence cannot be interpreted as lack of coverage. 
Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 30. 
 263. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010). 
 264. 340 F.3d 1367, 1374 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 265. In Certain Digital Models, the ITC acknowledges that “‘articles that infringe’ is not 
simply limited to patents, but also applies to trademarks and copyrights, as well as other unfair 
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Patent Act was explicitly passed in accordance with Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution; the Tariff Act was constructed to promote trade and 
later rewritten to secure support of protectionist congressmen for trade 
liberalization. No matter how broad or narrow patentable subject matter 
is under the Patent Act, it does not change the meaning of terms appearing 
in the Tariff Act.266 
2.  Statutory Context 
In its analysis, the ITC maintained that “[t]he meaning of ‘articles’ 
must also be interpreted in the context in which it appears in the 
statute.”267 It observed that “articles” appears with the terms 
“importation” and “sale,” and claimed that “articles subject to the statute 
are imported items that are bought and sold in commerce.”268  
The ITC then discussed two more recent cases where the Supreme 
Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the term 
“articles of commerce” to include information.269 Both of these cases 
involve the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), a statute that 
regulates driver information.270 The courts in these cases looked at 
whether information could be regulated as an “article of commerce” 
under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.271 The term “article of 
commerce,” however, appeared neither in the DPPA nor in the 
Constitution, making it wholly irrelevant to determining Congress’s 
intent.  
The ITC also observed that the term “importation” consists of 
“bringing an article into a country from the outside” and that “[i]f there 
be an actual bringing in[,] it is importation regardless of the mode by 
which it is effected.”272 The ITC then claimed that “based on the 
juxtaposition of the term ‘articles’ in relation to ‘importation’ and ‘sale’” 
in § 337, that “the intended meaning of ‘articles’ encompasses such items 
                                                                                                                     
acts and methods of competition in connection with importation and sale of articles.” Certain 
Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 54. 
 266. The use of “article” in patent law is narrower than the ITC’s definition. In In re Nuijten, 
the Federal Circuit held that the term “article” in the phrase “‘articles’ of ‘manufacture’” refers to 
“tangible articles or commodities,” and not “[a] transient electric or electromagnetic 
transmission.” 500 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In that case, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that a transitory, propagating signal is not patentable subject matter. Id. at 1357. 
 267. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 40. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 40–41 (discussing Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) and Senne v. Vill. 
of Palatine, 695 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 270. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (1994). 
 271. Reno, 528 U.S. at 148; Senne, 695 F.3d at 620–21. 
 272. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 41 (quoting Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 
262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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as are bought and sold in commerce and that are imported into the United 
States, regardless of the mode of importation.”273  
There are several problems with this line of analysis. The ITC’s broad 
definition of “articles” would render the term “importation” superfluous 
in § 337(a)(1)(B). Furthermore, the ITC failed to explain why 
“importation” having a broad meaning implies that “articles” does as 
well. Finally, the agency fails to explain how a statute passed in 1994 
sheds light on Congress’s intent more than 60 years earlier. 
3.  Presumption of Consistent Usage 
In interpreting ambiguous statutes, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
acknowledged a “normal rule of statutory construction that identical 
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same 
meaning.”274 As the Certain Digital Models dissent observes, the term 
“articles” appears throughout § 337, not just for the provision discussing 
IP infringement.275 Under §§ 337(d) and (e), the ITC noted that articles 
may be excluded.276 Yet, everything within these provisions necessarily 
refers only to tangible property given that is the limit of Customs’ 
authority.277 Consequently, the broad definition of “articles” does not 
make sense in the context of § 337 as a whole.278 
E.  Analysis of the ITC’s Definition 
Several problems exist with defining “articles” as being “imported 
items that are bought and sold in commerce.”279 If Congress truly 
intended for the ITC to stop every act of unfair competition, then why did 
it limit Customs’ jurisdiction under the Tariff Act to only goods arriving 
at a port? If Congress intended for “article” to be unbounded, then it 
presumably would have left Customs’ jurisdiction open as well.  
                                                                                                                     
 273. Id. The ITC tries a similar tactic with regard to the word “infringe,” noting that digital 
distributions of copyrighted songs constitute infringement, and because § 337 uses the phrase 
“‘articles that infringe,’” that “articles” must also refer to digital information. Id. at 41–42. Again, 
the agency fails to account for why statutory changes to what constitutes infringement that 
occurred after the last amendment to the Tariff Act should be relevant to its analysis. 
 274. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson v. Sec’y of 
Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 275. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 6–7 (Comm’r Johanson, dissenting). 
 276. Id. at 6 (Comm’r Johanson, dissenting); U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 132, at 
8. 
 277. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 6 (Comm’r Johanson, dissenting). 
 278. See id. at 7–8. “Article” is also used in many other provisions in the Tariff Act. For 
example, in § 1982(b), the Act refers to the President’s authority “governing the entry or 
withdrawal from warehouse of the . . . article” covered by a marketing agreement. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1982(b) (2012). The author is not familiar enough with the entirety of the Tariff Act to make 
judgments based on the history of the Tariff Act as a whole.  
 279. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 40. 
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Another issue is what else the ITC’s broad definition would have to 
include. Rights in stocks, bonds, and negotiable instruments are all forms 
of intangible personal property that can be bought or sold in commerce 
but have never been subject to the ITC’s jurisdiction. For example, 
suppose that a company in the United States purchases foreign financial 
instruments and then uses proceeds of its investment to engage in unfair 
competition. Under the ITC’s definition of “articles,” in rem jurisdiction 
would attach to the financial instruments.  
It is also troubling that the ITC lacks in rem jurisdiction over digital 
information. While the ITC can utilize in personam jurisdiction over 
parties that import digital information, it is unclear how the ITC has 
authority to commence its investigation without in rem jurisdiction.  
In a Chevron analysis, the reviewing court should find a Step One 
failure if Congress’s intent is clear.280 Here, it is clear that Congress 
intended “article” to be no broader than personal property. The ITC failed 
to offer any meaningful support for its proposition that “article” includes 
pure digital information. The plain meaning of the statute, the legislative 
history of the Tariff Act, and canons of construction support a narrow 
reading of the term. Consequently, the Federal Circuit should reverse the 
ITC. 
Even if the Federal Circuit finds that Step One is met, the ITC’s 
interpretation of “articles” is not reasonable under Step Two. The ITC 
chose the broadest interpretation of “articles” that was possible, one that 
dramatically expands its jurisdiction. But Congress could not have 
intended to give the ITC jurisdiction over intangible property in 1930, 
because Congress failed to give Customs authority to seize intangible 
property. In other words, the ITC would not have been able to offer any 
remedy to redress the unfair importation of intangible property until 
Congress granted it the ability to issue cease-and-desist orders more than 
40 years after the Tariff Act’s passage.  
The ITC’s opinion is a poor example of statutory interpretation. It 
misquotes the legislative history, makes comparisons to a Supreme Court 
decision involving newspaper articles, and uses non-contemporaneous 
(and often non-relevant) statutes in an attempt to justify its expansive 
definition.281 Under both steps of Chevron, the ITC’s interpretation of 
“articles” should not be granted deference. The Federal Circuit should, 
instead, define “articles” to mean “tangible personal property.”  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 280. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 281. The Certain Digital Goods decision raises the question whether agencies that are not 
trusted with substantive rulemaking authority should be entitled to Chevron deference. 
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IV.  EXPANDING THE REGULATION OF DIGITAL TRADE 
There is a growing concern that current IP and trade laws are 
inadequate for protecting rights holders from digital trade. The increasing 
availability of 3D printing, for example, has made it difficult for inventors 
to protect their patents against infringement from imported digital 
models. It is clear that legislators will need to revise IP statutes to provide 
better protection.  
At first glance, the ITC expanding its jurisdiction over digital trade 
appears limited in effect. The ITC cannot police electronic goods at the 
border and is currently limited to issuing cease-and-desist orders against 
U.S. entities. Moreover, if a patent merely claims a physical device, then 
importing a digital model would not actually infringe the patent.282 
Rather, infringement would occur only when an end user prints the 
device. 
Interest groups, however, are trying to use the problem of digital trade 
to implement widespread blocking of content on the Internet. Indeed, 
attempts have already been made to expand the ITC’s jurisdiction to 
allow it to “exclude” infringing online content. And a memorandum 
recently leaked in the Sony hack shows that the MPAA is looking to use 
the Certain Digital Models decision to have websites with infringing 
content blocked.283 
This Part argues that Congress should exercise caution before 
expanding the ITC’s powers. Section IV.A discusses how third parties 
are attempting to expand the ITC’s jurisdiction over digital trade.  Section 
IV.B discusses the risks of doing so, observing that the ITC champions 
strong IP rights at the expense of the public interest, and that it appears 
to lack substantive rulemaking and enforcement powers that it needs.  
A.  Attempts to Expand the ITC’s Jurisdiction 
Industry groups are attempting to further expand the ITC’s 
jurisdiction. They have already made several attempts to use the ITC to 
regulate the transmission of information on the Internet.284  
 
                                                                                                                     
 282. Certain Digital Models (Final), supra note 12, at 7 n.9. 
 283. See source cited infra note 294. 
 284. See, e.g., The Digital Trade Act of 2013, S. 1788, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (seeking to 
have agencies “staffed with experts and leaders to fulfill the mission of promoting an open, global 
Internet that facilitates commerce and digital trade,” as well as to facilitate dialogue with the 
private sector); Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. 
(2012); S. 2029, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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1.  Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act 
In 2011, members of Congress introduced the Online Protection and 
Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN).285 OPEN would have 
amended the Tariff Act to formally confer the ITC with jurisdiction over 
digital importation.286 It would have allowed the ITC to issue cease-and-
desist orders against entities that assisted in digital infringement, 
allowing the agency to shut down websites that facilitate infringement287 
and to stop advertisers and financial transaction services from facilitating 
digital infringement.288 Websites that had existing take-down 
mechanisms would have been excluded.289 
This proposed legislation had the broad support of many technology 
companies, including Google, Mozilla, and Facebook; the legislation was 
considered by many to be superior to PIPA and SOPA.290 Professor Eric 
Goldman noted that “[u]nlike SOPA’s disgustingly blatant rent-
seeking, . . . OPEN provides a useful starting point for a sensible 
conversation that could actually lead to acceptable compromises.”291 
However, Professor Goldman pointed out that a fortress-like mentality 
for digital goods does not make sense, given that networks do not have 
borders.292 He further noted that the ITC is a peculiar choice of venue, 
given that it is an agency with procedural differences from a court, which 
could lead to dual litigation.293 
2.  Subsequent Legal Efforts  
Although OPEN failed to pass, the MPAA was not deterred. After the 
Sony hack, a memorandum from August 2014 (MPAA Memo) emerged 
                                                                                                                     
 285. H.R. 3782; S. 2029; see also Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public 
Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 203, 244 (2013) 
(discussing OPEN). 
 286. See S. 2029 § 337A(b) (amending the Tariff Act to make it unlawful “for an Internet 
site dedicated to infringing activity to facilitate imports into the United States”). 
 287. Id. § 337A(f)(1)(A) (granting the ITC power to “issue an order to cease and desist the 
infringing activity of the Internet site against the Internet site and to the owner and the operator 
of the Internet site”). 
 288. Id. § 337A(g) (stating that if the ITC “reasonably believes that a financial transaction 
provider or an Internet advertising service . . . supplies services to the Internet site” subject to 
§ 337A, the ITC can require them to take measures to prohibit payment processing or advertising 
for such websites). 
 289. Id. § 337A(a)(8)(C)(i). 
 290. Gary Shapiro, Congress Must Keep the Internet OPEN, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 23, 2012, 
11:12 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/01/23/congress-must-keep-the-internet-open/. 
 291. Eric Goldman, The OPEN Act: Significantly Flawed, but More Salvageable than 
SOPA/PROTECT-IP, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 12, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2011/12/the-open-act-significantly-flawed-but-more-salvageable-than-sopaprotect-ip/. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
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from two law firms.294 The MPAA Memo responds to the MPAA’s 
request that the firms investigate a strategy of seeking an order from the 
ITC requiring internet service providers (ISPs) to block traffic from 
foreign websites.  
The MPAA Memo first considers “transit ISPs,” which are ISPs that 
carry data across U.S. borders.295 It maintains that transit ISPs can be 
characterized as importers of data, which it claims is an infringing 
“article”.296 However, the MPAA Memo recognizes that a site-blocking 
order is not technologically feasible, given that it would require 
monitoring of inbound internet traffic and would rely upon IP address 
blocking.297 It notes that the firms’ technology experts confirmed that 
identifying responsible transit ISPs would be “daunting.”298  
The MPAA Memo alternatively suggests that domestic network 
access ISPs are engaged in the “sale” of imported articles, by virtue of 
providing infringing imported data to subscribers, or are more generally 
engaged in “unfair acts.”299 If one of these theories sticks, the MPAA 
could seek a cease-and-desist order requiring the network ISPs to block 
subscriber access to certain websites. It acknowledges that whether an 
order can require an ISP to affirmatively block websites is a question of 
first impression, “especially when the order would effectively require 
blocking of outbound requests from users rather than inbound (i.e., 
“imported”) traffic from the pirate site.”300 Nevertheless, the lawyers who 
authored the memo “believe there is a reasonable basis for the ITC’s 
authority to do so.”301 
B.  Expanding the ITC’s Jurisdiction 
Congress should exercise caution when evaluating whether to expand 
the ITC’s jurisdiction under the Tariff Act. Admittedly, the Tariff Act is 
overdue for revision, given that it has not received a major overhaul in 
more than twenty-five years.302 Since that time, numerous ITC concerns 
                                                                                                                     
 294. See Memorandum from Jenner & Block LLP and Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, 
LLP to the Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. (Aug. 15, 2014), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1389047/250191712-use-of-the-itc-to-block-foreign-pirate.pdf. 
 295. Id. at 2. 
 296. Id. at 4. 
 297. Id. at 2–3. Site blocking in Europe relies on monitoring outbound traffic from 
consumers seeking the contraband information. Id. at 3. 
 298. Id. at 3.  
 299. Id. at 5. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Some changes were made to the Tariff Act under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
of 1994, which limited the scope of general exclusion orders, removed ITC time limits for § 337 
actions, permitted counterclaims, and provided the respondent with the power to stay a parallel 
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have arisen beyond just digital infringement, such as whether exclusion 
orders are too vague,303 whether patent trolls should be utilizing the 
ITC,304 and whether protectionism still has a place in U.S. trade policy.305 
However, in revisiting the Tariff Act, Congress should also consider 
whether the ITC is the best institution to protect IP rights holders from 
digital infringement. 
1.  General Concerns 
Allowing IP rights holders to have websites blocked raises major 
concerns regarding censorship. These are the same issues that arose under 
the failed SOPA and PIPA legislation.306 First, true website blocking 
would require creating a digital net around the United States, routing all 
                                                                                                                     
district court proceeding. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 321, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 
4809, 4943–4944 (1994). However, the focus of this legislation was quite narrow: to remedy a 
decision from the GATT reporting that § 337 violated Article III of the GATT. See Kumar, Expert, 
supra note 9, at 1561 (citing Report of the Panel, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.), at 345–54 (1990)). 
 303. See Ryan Davis, ITC Import Bans in IP Cases Need Overhaul, White House Told, LAW 
360 (July 23, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/458994/itc-import-bans-in-ip-cases-need-
overhaul-white-house-told (discussing the IP community’s concern about overly vague exclusion 
orders, forcing Customs to determine whether imported products infringe patent claims). 
 304. See Jared A. Favole & Brett Kendall, Obama Plans to Take Action Against Patent-
Holding Firms, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2013, 11:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424 
127887324563004578524182593163220 (noting that President Obama “is looking to rein in the 
growing use” of the ITC for patent disputes and observing that patent trolls “have increasingly 
filed infringement claims at the ITC”). 
 305. Several countries have complained about the protectionist policies surrounding § 337, 
including South Korea and China. See Chris O’Brien, White House Veto Raises Stakes in Apple-
Samsung Patent Dispute, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/05/business/ 
la-fi-0806-apple-patent-war-20130806 (showing that the South Korea Ministry of Trade, 
Industry, and Energy was concerned “about the negative impact that such a decision would have 
on the protection of patent rights”); David Gray, China Says U.S. Solar Ruling Smacks of 
Protectionism, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2011, 10:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/12/04/us-china-solar-idUSTRE7B302X20111204#vGzGZpOdl2xDjsYU.97 (“China said it 
was ‘deeply concerned’ about a preliminary ruling by a U.S. trade body that trade practices by 
Chinese solar makers are hurting U.S. producers and said the decision underscored a U.S. 
‘inclination to trade protectionism.’”). But see Colleen Chien, Patently Protectionist? An 
Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 63, 94–95 (2008) (noting that “while ITC respondents often include foreign companies, as 
intended by Congress, they are also increasingly including domestic companies and public 
companies”). 
 306. See, e.g., Net Founders Fight Piracy Law with ‘Censorship’ Claim, BBC NEWS (Mar. 
8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16195344 (noting that “[SOPA] aims to stop 
online ad networks and payment processors from doing business with foreign websites accused 
of enabling or facilitating copyright infringement,” and could block search engines from linking 
to infringing websites, force domain name registrars to take down websites, and require ISPs to 
block access to infringing websites). 
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internet traffic through fixed points.307 Even if the ITC did not misuse the 
power, the potential for abuse by the government is immense. A number 
of IP commentators have discussed these concerns at length.308 
Another general problem is the difficulty in determining when 
information enters the country. As Professor Winston has noted, while 
patent law is territorial, technology is not.309 Before Congress can allow 
the ITC to go after information entering into the United States, it must 
have a firmer idea of when information becomes subject to U.S. law.  
Related to the problem of boundaries is determining how the ITC 
would treat internet traffic that inadvertently routes through the United 
States. If the ITC had the ability to seize imported electronic information, 
it could do so for content not intended for a U.S. recipient.310 For 
example, suppose that a company in London performs a method 
described in a U.S. patent but is unprotected elsewhere. The London 
company then sends resulting data to a customer in Mexico City. Because 
underwater fiber optic cable links London to North America via the East 
Coast,311 that traffic would pass through the United States and would 
potentially be subject to ITC jurisdiction. The ITC needs to clarify its 
position to prevent inadvertent U.S. importation from becoming 
actionable.  
2.  Institutional Design Concerns 
Even if Congress decides that website blocking is desirable, it is not 
clear that the ITC is the best institution to implement it. The ITC is known 
for promoting strong IP rights at the expensive of the public welfare. It 
also lacks powers that it needs to be effective. 
                                                                                                                     
 307. See Goldman, supra note 195 (“OPEN still contemplates reestablishing a Fortress USA. 
Fortress USA marginally makes sense regarding the shipment of physical goods across 
geographic borders. It makes zero sense for digital bits zinging around the borderless network.”). 
 308. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. 
L. REV. 891, 891 (discussing the reaction to SOPA and PIPA); David S. Levine, Bring in the 
Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of International Intellectual Property, 30 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 126 (2012) (discussing SOPA and PIPA, and observing how the 
arguments in that debate apply in a trade context). 
 309. Winston, supra note 193, at 1. 
 310. Cf. Nicholas Weaver, Our Government Has Weaponized the Internet, WIRED (Nov. 13, 
2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/11/this-is-how-the-internet-backbone-has-been-turned-into-
a-weapon (discussing the means by which governments can seize electronic information that 
passes through their respective countries). Internet traffic can also be deliberately rerouted, a 
practice that is known as “traffic interception.” Jim Cowie, The New Threat: Targeted Internet 
Traffic Misdirection, DYN RESEARCH (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.renesys.com/2013/11/mitm-
internet-hijacking/. One would hope that artificial attempts to gain U.S. jurisdiction would fail in 
a court or agency. 
 311. See Trans-Atlantic, SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORKS, http://submarinenetworks.com/
systems/trans-atlantic (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
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a.  Public Welfare Considerations 
As a federal agency, the ITC can issue injunctive-like relief without 
meeting the same high standards that a court must meet. In eBay v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held that a court cannot issue 
an injunction in a patent case unless the plaintiff can show “(1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law . . . are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction.”312 EBay does not, however, apply to orders issued 
by the ITC because the ITC is an agency that is instead bound by its 
organic statute.313 Consequently, if Congress allows digital trade cases 
into the ITC, this will allow the ITC to  issue more quasi-injunctive relief 
compared to a federal court.314  
Section 337 does require the ITC to consider the public welfare prior 
to issuing an exclusion order or cease-and-desist order.315 But in practice, 
the public welfare requirement rarely prevents it from granting relief.316 
The ITC has not denied an exclusion order on public policy grounds in 
more than thirty years.317 The three occasions in which an exclusion order 
was denied involved a special hospital bed which kept burn patients 
alive,318 devices needed for nuclear weapon development,319 and auto 
parts needed during the 1979 energy crisis.320  
                                                                                                                     
 312. 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 313. See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that eBay does not apply to ITC determinations under § 337 because exclusion orders 
are based on the criteria set forth in the Tariff Act and not on traditional equitable considerations).  
 314. Professor Colleen Chien has shown that the ITC grants injunctions at a far greater rate 
than district courts. See Chien, supra note 305, at 63. 
 315. Sections 337 (d), (e), and (g) (pertaining to exclusion orders) and § 337(f) (pertaining 
to cease-and-desist orders) contain language stating that the ITC must consider the effect of the 
remedy “upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, 
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States 
consumers.” 
 316. See Kumar, Other Patent Agency, supra note 10, at 567–70 (discussing how the ITC 
has not denied an exclusion order on public policy grounds since 1984, though conceding that the 
ITC does sometimes narrow exclusion orders for public policy reasons). 
 317. In re Certain Foam Masking Tape, Inv. No. 337-TA-528, USITC Pub. 3968, at *8 n.7 
(Dec. 2007) (observing that the ITC “has declined to issue a remedy based on the public interest 
in only three investigations”). 
 318. See In re Fluidized Supporting Apparatus, Inv. No. 337-TA-182/188, USITC Pub. 
1667, at *1–2 (Oct. 1984) (denying an exclusion order for hospital beds for burn victims where 
the beds were in short supply and were superior to other beds on the market). 
 319. In re Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119, at *10 (Dec. 1980) (denying an exclusion order for devices used in 
nuclear weapon development where no suitable alternative existed). 
 320. In re Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at *11 
(Dec. 1979) (denying exclusion order for a patented auto part that was needed to improve fuel 
efficiency during the 1979 energy crisis). 
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In a typical public interest analysis, the commissioners note how rare 
it is for permanent relief to be denied, citing to the three investigations 
discussed above.321 Unless there is a life or death situation or a national 
emergency, no public interest is sufficient to outweigh the rights of the 
IP holder.  
On the surface, it might appear that the ITC cares more about the 
rights of the patent holders than the public. The agency noted that 
“exclusionary relief should only be denied when the adverse effect on the 
public interest factors would be greater than the interest in protecting the 
patent holder.”322 But it also believes that the public interest is generally 
advanced by the strong protection of patent rights. In considering the 
public interest requirement under § 337, the ITC has quoted legislative 
history stating that “a public interest in the enforcement of protected 
intellectual property rights” exists and that the importation of infringing 
merchandise “indirectly harms the public interest.”323 The Federal Circuit 
generally accepts the ITC’s argument,324 although some scholars reject 
it.325  
                                                                                                                     
 321. See, e.g., In re Certain Home Vacuum Packaging Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-496, USITC 
Pub. 3681, at *5 (Jan. 2004) (“The Commission has, in rare instances, declined to issue permanent 
relief when the adverse effect on the public interest was greater that the interest in protecting rights 
secured by valid patents.”); In re Certain Pers. Data & Mobile Commc’ns Devices and Related 
Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 2011-32869, at *42 (Dec. 2011) (“With respect to 
public health and welfare, the Commission has historically examined whether ‘an exclusion order 
would deprive the public of products necessary for some important health or welfare need: energy 
efficient automobiles, basic scientific research, or hospital equipment.’” (quoting Spansion, Inc. 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010))). 
 322. In re Certain Optoelectric Devices for Fiber Optic Commc’ns, Components Thereof, 
and Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-860, USITC Pub. 2013-30250, at *130 (Dec. 
2013) (Initial Determination) [hereinafter Certain Optoelectric Devices]. 
 323. In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets, Transmitter, and Receiver (Radio) 
Chips, Power Control Chips, & Products Containing the Same, Including Cellular Telephone 
Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. No. 4258, at *32 (Oct. 2011) (Final) (quoting S. 
Rep. 100-71, at 128 (1987)). The commissioner’s view of strong patent rights is not shared by all 
of the administrative law judges. See, e.g., id. at *46, *46 n. 355 (noting that the ALJ found that 
the third EPROM factor weighs against awarding a broad exclusion order to the patent holder). 
 324. See San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 1347, 
1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming the ITC, noting that in “addressing the ‘public interest’ factor, 
the Commission determined that the public interest favors the protection of intellectual property 
rights and weighs in favor of a ‘significant penalty’”). Even if the Federal Circuit disagreed, the 
ITC is entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretation of its organic statute. 
 325. For example, the enforcement of patents held by patent trolls have been found to harm 
the public welfare, including in the ITC. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2012) (discussing how 
the ITC Commissioners have “regularly rejected public interest arguments when it finds either 
that alternative suppliers can’t provide comparable products or that the products aren’t critical to 
public health and welfare,” including in cases where there were “[s]ignificant public health 
interests”); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
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The ITC has shown some signs of softening its approach. In recent 
years, several exclusion orders have been narrowed based on public 
policy concerns.326 The ITC has also begun to scrutinize complaints 
brought by patent trolls.  
Nevertheless, Congress and the courts should think carefully before 
expanding the ITC’s jurisdiction. So long as § 337 lacks adequate 
safeguards to protect the public welfare and is grounded in outdated 
protectionist principles, it will continue to overuse exclusion orders and 
cease-and-desist orders, and allow patent holders to continue to 
circumvent the more onerous equitable balancing test used by federal 
courts.327 
b.  ITC Powers  
For website blocking, the ITC is a weaker institution than a court. 
First, it is unclear that the ITC has substantive rulemaking authority. 
Although § 1335 of the Tariff Act states that it “is authorized to adopt 
such reasonable procedures and rules and regulations as it deems 
necessary to carry out its functions and duties,”328 there is debate as to 
whether that provision refers to merely non-substantive rules.329 Prior to 
1980, the ITC never attempted to promulgate a substantive rule.330 
The ITC’s one attempt to issue a substantive rule was with regard to 
the labeling of steel wire rope.331 Some members of Congress objected, 
                                                                                                                     
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2124 (2013) (discussing how patent trolls harm innovation and provide 
little social benefit, yet can utilize the ITC). 
 326. See Certain Optoelectric Devices, supra note 322, at *130. See also K. William Watson, 
Anti-Patent Troll Bill Must Not Sidestep ITC Reform, Cato (Oct. 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.cato.org/blog/anti-patent-troll-bill-must-not-sidestep-itc-reform (acknowledging the 
problem of patent trolls using the ITC, but arguing that increased protectionism is not the 
solution). 
 327. There is clear historical precedent for IP interest groups expanding the ITC’s 
jurisdiction to suit their needs. See supra Part I.A.  
 328. 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012). 
 329. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on Int’l Trade of the Committee on Finance U.S. 
Senate, 96th Cong., at 28 (1980) (noting that the ITC was considering the use of substantive 
rulemaking to assist with § 337 actions). 
 330. See Proposed Rule Requiring Country-of-Origin Marking of Imported Steel Wire Rope, 
45 Fed. Reg. 12835, 12835–12836 (proposed Feb. 27, 1980) (“Although substantive rulemaking 
is no longer a novelty in the practice of administrative law, this Commission has not previously 
employed it.”). 
 331. See id.; International Trade Commission: Substantive Rule on Steel Wire Rope 
Withdrawn, Issue of Rulemaking Authority Not Addressed, BNA NEWS & COMMENT, Dec. 3, 1980, 
at A1 available at http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?
type=file&item=499870; Congressional Memorandum from Bill to H. John Heinz III, available 
at http://doi.library.cmu.edu/10.1184/pmc/heinz/box00133/fld00025/bdl0007/doc0001 (noting 
ITC rulemaking procedures for steel wire rope was an issue to be addressed at a Congressional 
hearing). 
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maintaining that the ITC lacks substantive rulemaking authority.332 The 
ITC was ultimately forced to withdraw the rule, failing to directly address 
the issue of what its rulemaking authority entails.333  
The bigger question of whether the ITC has substantive rulemaking 
authority does not appear to have ever been resolved.334 Such power 
would allow the ITC to clarify the meaning of ambiguous terms in § 337 
while receiving valuable public input. It would be especially useful given 
how infrequently Congress amends the Tariff Act. 
Second, the ITC lacks direct enforcement authority over exclusion 
orders and cease-and-desist orders. The ITC can conduct formal 
enforcement proceedings to modify or revoke an earlier order.335 
However, to enforce any of its orders, the ITC must bring a civil action 
in a federal district court.336 Given how weak the ITC is, it raises the 
question of whether a court or even another agency might be better suited 
for dealing with website blocking.337 
CONCLUSION 
The ITC’s jurisdiction does not appear to extend to digital 
information. The defining characteristic of property subject to in rem 
jurisdiction is that one person or entity can control it. A court or agency 
can seize control over tangible property, such as land, and even some 
intangible property, such as domain names. But nobody can seize pure 
information. This limitation of the ITC’s jurisdiction makes sense, given 
that Customs can only seize physical goods at the border under the Tariff 
                                                                                                                     
 332. Proposed Rule Requiring Country-of-Origin Marking of Imported Steel Wire Rope, 45 
Fed. Reg. at 12836 (discussing the disagreement between members of Congress on whether the 
ITC has substantive rulemaking authority); Letter from John Danforth and John Heinz to the Hon. 
Catherine Bedell (May 19, 1980) (maintaining that § 1335 grants the ITC substantive rulemaking 
authority), available at http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&
item=499872. 
 333. Id. 
 334. A search of the Federal Register reveals that since 1980, the ITC has not proposed any 
substantive rules. But that alone does not tell us whether the ITC does or doesn’t have substantive 
rulemaking authority. 
 335. 19 C.F.R. § 210.75(c) (2015). 
 336. Id. § 210.75(b)(4)(ii). 
 337. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is a potential candidate. It recently 
approved a plan reclassifying broadband Internet as a utility, giving the FCC greater regulatory 
power over it. Dave Boyer, Split FCC Approves “Net Neutrality” Plan; Dissenters Decry Obama 
“Power Grab,” WASH. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/26/fcc-
approves-net-neutrality-plan/. However, the fact that the FCC historically had little power might 
warrant caution on any further expansion of its power. See Brendan Sasso, Net Neutrality Has 
Sparked an Interagency Squabble over Internet Privacy, NAT’L J. (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/the-future-of-broadband/net-neutrality-has-sparked-an-
interagency-squabble-over-internet-privacy-20150309 (discussing how the FCC’s newly asserted 
power might be overstepping the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission). 
50
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/2
2015] REGULATING DIGITAL TRADE 1959 
 
Act. Because the ITC’s in personam jurisdiction is secondary, it is not 
clear that the ITC has jurisdiction to investigate cases involving digital 
trade. 
The ITC’s statutory authority under the Tariff Act is also narrow. The 
legislative history of the statute shows that Congress intended to limit the 
term “articles” to personal property. Moreover, the ITC’s statutory 
analysis supporting its expansive definition of “article” is at best sloppy 
and at worst grossly misleading. The ITC misquotes legislative history, 
cites to statutes passed decades after the Tariff Act, and relies on a 
Supreme Court decision regarding newspaper articles in an attempt to 
support its interpretation. Under no standard of review could the ITC’s 
interpretation survive.  
Attempts by the ITC to further expand its jurisdiction should be 
scrutinized. Although the Certain Digital Models decision is somewhat 
narrow, IP rights holders are seeking to extend the ITC’s power to 
exclude information at a nonexistent digital border. The MPAA Memo 
shows how attractive this idea is to the pro-copyright lobby, 
notwithstanding the detrimental effect that it could have on consumers. 
The courts and Congress should not lose sight of the fact that the Tariff 
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